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BUYER BEWARE:
WHY JOHNS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH
STATUTORY RAPE FOR BUYING SEX FROM A
CHILD
Amanda Shapiro*
Despite the common conception that human trafficking is primarily a problem beyond our shores, sex trafficking is a growing
epidemic within the United States. Sex traffickers are increasingly
preying on children in particular in response to growing demand
for paid sex with younger girls and boys. Strikingly, the criminal
justice system charges and prosecutes these trafficking victims for
selling sex even though they have been forced into the trade. Unlike trafficked children, the adults who buy sex from them are rarely charged and, if they are, the charge—a low-level misdemeanor
or violation—fails to reflect the gravity of their crime. Take away
the exchange of money, and the justice system appropriately deems
these children victims and their patrons rapists for engaging in the
exact same acts.
This Note argues that prosecutors should prosecute these adult
patrons, also known as johns, with statutory rape. Their conduct
constitutes child rape whether money is exchanged or not. The
current charges of misdemeanors and violations are inadequate to
reflect the severity of their crimes. By contrast, statutory rape is, in
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; M.S. in Teaching, Pace
University School of Education, 2010; B.A., Harvard College, 2008. This
endeavor would have been impossible without the following things in my life:
the knowledge and collaboration of Professor Cynthia Godsoe and my
colleagues at AEquitas, who introduced me to this topic; the feedback and
support from my feminist family, Marie Lee, Lauren Shapiro, and Alan Shapiro;
the impeccable attention to detail from the Journal of Law and Policy’s
leadership and support staff; and, the enthusiastic permission to engage in
panicked, late-night discussions about an impossibly heavy topic from my
partner and academic cheerleader, Daniel Souleles.
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every state, a felony offense that imposes strict liability on an adult
who has sex with a child under a certain age. Charging johns with
an offense that more accurately reflects their criminality would reinforce the notion that children trafficked into the sex industry are
victims, not criminals, and that the law must similarly treat trafficked and non-trafficked children. Additionally, the heightened
penalty would decrease demand for trafficked children by deterring johns from participating in and thus driving the child sex
market.
INTRODUCTION
A. Statutory Rape: Two Different Outcomes
Nina1 met her long-term high school boyfriend when they
locked eyes in study hall. They became fast friends. Soon after,
they fell in love. Although their relationship had an age gap—Nina
was fifteen and her boyfriend was eighteen—that did not stop them
from imagining a blissful future together. They talked about
marriage, buying a house, and raising children together. They had
sex, but sex was not what defined their relationship. The pair could
wile away hours just talking. Nina’s father, however, felt that Nina
was spending too much time with her new boyfriend, so he
reported their sexual relationship to the police in the hopes of
separating them. The police charged Nina’s boyfriend with
statutory rape, a felony offense. As a result of his conviction,
Nina’s boyfriend was registered as a sex offender and is now
serving ten years probation.2
1

Names have been fabricated or changed. This narrative has been adapted
from an article that ran in the Hartford Courant, “A Plan to Redefine Teen Sex
Offenders.” Hilda Munoz, A Plan to Redefine Teen Sex Offenders, HARTFORD
COURANT
(May
3,
2007),
http://articles.courant.com/2007-0503/news/0705030904_1_offender-statutory-sexual. See also Meredith Cohen,
Note, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and Unusual
Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 721–22 (2008)
(discussing the incident).
2
See Cohen, supra note 1, at 722. See generally Michele Goodwin, Law’s
Limits: Regulating Statutory Rape Law, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 481, 540 (2013)
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Vivian,3 on the other hand, did not have a chance to fall in love
the way Nina did. When Vivian was fifteen years old, her father
decided that he was tired of paying child support to her mother. In
an effort to stave off the mounting debts, Vivian’s father arranged
for a male friend to kidnap her for use as human collateral. Her
father’s friend told Vivian that she had to sell her body for sex in
order to pay off debts her father owed him, and beat her when she
resisted. The man—now Vivian’s “pimp”—scheduled the first
“customer,” a forty-year-old man, to buy her sexual services. This
customer saw her black eye and other bruises all over her body.
After noting her young features, he had sex with her anyway. The
entire fee went to Vivian’s pimp.
Unlike the authorities who arrested Nina’s young boyfriend,
the police here neither arrested nor charged the man who bought
sex from Vivian.4 Even if the police had arrested him and the local
prosecutor had pressed charges, the charge would have been either
a simple violation5—the equivalent of failing to use one’s turn
signal while driving6—or a misdemeanor offense,7 neither of

(arguing that statutory rape laws, as applied now, lead to absurd criminal results
for teenage, consensual sexual activity).
3
This narrative has been adapted from children’s experiences recorded in
an in-depth study in New York City on child victims of sex trafficking. See RIC
CURTIS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
OF CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY: VOL. ONE 47–48 (2008).
4
See CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 265 (15th ed.
2014) (indicating a “reluctance on the part of law enforcement officers to arrest
patrons”) (citations omitted); see also 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 14 (2014)
(noting that some courts interpret prostitution statutes as being inapplicable to
patrons) (citations omitted).
5
See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 265 (citing the Model Penal Code, which
criminalizes a patron of prostitution: “[a] person commits a violation if he hires
a prostitute to engage in sexual activity with him . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE §
251.2(5) (2012) (emphasis added)). The offense of “prostitution” (i.e. offering or
engaging in sexual activity for money) under the Model Penal Code is a “petty
misdemeanor.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2(5) (2012).
6
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW art. 28, § 1163 (McKinney 2014).
7
See TORCIA, supra note 4 (citing typical patron offenses, ranging from
Class A to Class B misdemeanors, e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83 (West
2013)); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5614 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1343
(2013)).
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which often leads to serving jail time.8 On the other hand, the
authorities likely would have charged Vivian with a crime9—even
though she was a juvenile, and even though, in the sexual crimes
provisions of the penal code, she was legally incapable of
consenting to any sexual activity.10
The criminalization of prostitution—specifically, the
criminalization of people selling their bodies for sex—has so
warped the criminal justice system that a child forced into sex
would likely be convicted of prostitution, while the person who
raped11 her would receive a mere warning, if any criminal
8

First-time offenders rarely serve jail time, even for a misdemeanor, and
diversion options allow johns to easily have their charges dismissed. See
MICHAEL SHIVELY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., A NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF
PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION EFFORTS, FINAL
REPORT 10 (2012), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
238796.pdf.
9
See Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging
Legal Responses to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 18 (2011) (“[Y]oung girls are prosecuted at reportedly higher
rates than even the men who exploit them.”) (citations omitted).
10
See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“A child of tender years is deemed
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse; therefore, the child’s apparent
‘consent’ is immaterial.”); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(3)(a) (West
2013) (“A person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is: . . . [l]ess
than sixteen (16) years old.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(9) (West 2013)
(“An act of sexual intercourse [or] rape . . . is without the consent of the victim .
. . [if] the victim is younger than 14 years of age.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
761(k) (2013) (“A child who has not yet reached that child’s sixteenth birthday
is deemed unable to consent to a sexual act with a person more than 4 years
older than said child. Children who have not yet reached their twelfth birthday
are deemed unable to consent to a sexual act under any circumstances.”).
11
This note uses the term “sexual assault” here since most penal codes
criminalize statutory rape as some degree of “sexual assault” or “rape.” See, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B) (2013) (“A person is guilty of gross
sexual assault if that person engages in sexual act with another person and . . .
the other person . . . has not in fact attained the age of 14 years.”) (emphasis
added); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(1)(l) (“A person is guilty of the felony
of aggravated felonious sexual assault if such person engages in sexual
penetration with another person . . . [w]hen the victim is less than 13 years of
age.”) (emphasis added); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2013) (“Sexual
Assault . . . No person shall engage in a sexual act with a child who is under the
age of 16 . . . .”) (emphasis added); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(1) (2013)
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sanctions. Under the sexual assault provisions of most penal
codes in the United States, Vivian legally meets the definition of a
victim of statutory rape, and the man who used her for sex, a
felon.12 The intent behind statutory rape legislation is to protect
children from predatory, coercive adults.13 Nina’s boyfriend, a
teenager in the throes of young love, is not the menace society
wants to criminalize for statutory rape. On the other hand,
adults14 who buy sex from children forced into the sex trade—
(“Rape . . . is the penetration . . . of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening . . .
accomplished . . . [w]here the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years and
the perpetrator is eighteen (18) years of age or older.”) (emphasis added); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.050(1)(a) (West 2013) (“A person is guilty of rape in
the second degree when . . . [b]eing eighteen (18) years old or more, he engages
in sexual intercourse with another person less than fourteen (14) years old . . . .”)
(emphasis added); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(1) (McKinney 2014) (“A person
is guilty of rape in the second degree when . . . being eighteen years old or
more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than
fifteen years old . . . .”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.375(1)(b)
(West 2013) (“A person who has sexual intercourse with another person
commits the crime of rape in the first degree if . . . [t]he victim is under 12 years
of age.”) (emphasis added).
12
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 771(a)(1) (2013) (“A person is
guilty of rape in the third degree when the person . . . [i]ntentionally engages in
sexual intercourse with another person and the victim has not reached that
victim’s sixteenth birthday and the person is at least 10 years older than the
victim . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (West 2013) (“A person commits the
offense of statutory rape when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with any
person under the age of 16 years . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(1) (2013)
(“Rape . . . is the penetration . . . of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening . . . [w]here
the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years and the perpetrator is eighteen
(18) years of age or older.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2013) (“No
person shall engage in a sexual act with a child who is under the age of 16 . . .
.”). Vivian’s experience also carries implications for a level of sexual assault
even higher than statutory rape, given that the offender seemed to know he was
forcing her into sex. See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“Although force is not an
element of statutory rape, if a defendant does use force, he may be guilty of
common-law (forcible) rape even with respect to a female who is under the age
of consent.”) (citations omitted).
13
Tamar R. Birkhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy,
and Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1096 (2011).
14
Women and men have been perpetrators of both statutory rape and
patronizing a prostitute, but the vast majority of adults who drive the prostitution
industry are men; and the majority of child victims are girls. See, e.g., CURTIS ET
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regardless of whether they know their victim is a child—are
exactly the population our society would wish to criminalize
through statutory rape laws.15
This Note describes how children of the commercial sex
industry are victimized twice: first, by the sexual exploitation
itself, and second, by a criminal justice system that criminalizes
them for being exploited.16 The use of prostitution laws against
minors in this country remains inequitable: children incapable of
consenting to sex are charged with prostitution, while the adults
who raped them are ignored or dismissed. This Note argues that a
deep legal and societal misunderstanding of prostitution, which
views prostitutes as reckless unchaste women, drives both the
criminalization of child victims of the sex trade and the lack of
criminalization of the adults who buy sex from them. This Note
then argues that prosecutors should remedy this injustice and
AL., supra note 3, at 79 (The researchers discovered a surprising number of
female johns who had bought sex from both male and female child victims.
However, researchers were somewhat skeptical of the figures reported by male
child victims about female johns because of the “stigma attached to
homosexuality,” therefore “admitting that [their] clientele was exclusively male
was difficult.”); see also Global Sex Trafficking Fact Sheet, EQUALITY NOW,
http://www.equalitynow.org/node/1010 (last visited September 15, 2014)
(Worldwide, 98% of commercial sexual exploitation victims are female.);
Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R41878, p. 7 (June 21, 2011), available
at
https://d1qkyo3pi1c9bx.cloudfront.net/
00028B1B-B0DB-4FCD-A991219527535DAB/7ad602de-1738-4ccf-983f-7ed0b20a37fb.pdf (“[M]ost victims
of sex trafficking in the U.S. are women and children.”).
15
Cf. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors:
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2000)
(discussing the worst of statutory rape crimes, where an adult preys on a young
child for sexual gratification). Though Oberman is certainly correct that
statutory rape involves greater culpability when there is specific intent, it is my
proposition that policy considerations weigh in favor of a law that targets both
those with intent to rape minors and those without that specific intent.
16
While addressing the need to decriminalize the child victims of this
industry is one aspect of remedying this injustice, it is beyond the scope of this
Note, and has already been analyzed admirably. See generally Annitto, supra
note 9; Birkhead, supra note 13; Rebecca Carroll Sager, An Anomaly of the
Law: Insufficient State Laws Fail to Protect Minor Victims of Sex Trafficking,
38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 359 (2012); Cynthia Godsoe,
Punishing to Protect, 52 H OUS . L AW R EV . (forthcoming 2015).
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inconsistency in the law by charging such adults with statutory
rape. This solution is advantageous because it does not require
enacting new legislation or dramatically altering the criminal
justice system. It merely requires that prosecutors use their
discretion to charge people who buy sex from children with the
higher offense of statutory rape rather than the misdemeanor
offense of soliciting a prostitute.
Charging these offenders with statutory rape would serve three
purposes. First, it would reinforce the notion that these children are
victimized youth who are incapable of consenting to sexual
activity, and that the law should protect rather than punish them.
Second, it would provide consistency in the law for courts that
have long grappled with the dilemma of criminalizing children for
their own rapes. Third, a felony charge against these perpetrators
would decrease the demand for child trafficking by using the
threats of both significant jail time and a felony record to deter
potential buyers.
Part I of this Note frames the problem of the sexual
exploitation of children as a prosecutorial failure of underusing
statutory rape. It provides a definitions section, which clarifies the
terms used in this Note in order to more aptly describe the
experiences of child victims of sexual exploitation. Part II.A
identifies the victims of commercial sexual exploitation and details
the methods by which adults lure them into exploitation. Part II.B
describes recent state sex trafficking statutes aimed at confronting
this exploitation and discusses the gross limitations in even the
most robust statutes. Part II.C lists the reasons why law
enforcement continues to arrest and prosecute children for their
own rapes. Part III frames these reasons within the larger context
of the unjust criminalization of adults who sell sex and the lack of
criminalization of the adults who buy sex. Part IV details the
superiority of a statutory rape-charging mechanism over other
proposals for child exploitation reform. Part IV also cites the
overall lack of charges against adults who buy sex from children
and instances where a statutory rape charge would have proved
useful. Finally, Part V concludes with the limitations of this Note’s
solution and invites policymakers to remedy the other identified
factors that force children into sexual exploitation.
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THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
TERMS

OF

CHILDREN: DEFINITION

OF

Defining terms is not only useful for the consistency and clarity
of this Note, but it is also an important step in achieving justice for
victims. The road to justice often begins with public awareness. At
the moment, the focus on the commercial sexual exploitation of
children is on children as “prostitutes”17 and traffickers as
“pimps.”18 By shifting the rhetoric from prostitute to victim, from
pimp to trafficker, and from customer to perpetrator, this Note
seeks to disclose the experiences of children in the commercial sex
industry.
A. Victims of the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
(CSEC)
This Note will refer to minors engaged in prostitution as
“victims of the commercial sexual exploitation of children
(CSEC),”19 and will focus largely on domestic victims. Academics
17

See, e.g., Ian Urbina, For Runaways, Sex Buys Survival, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/us/27runaways.html
?pagewanted=all (referring to a victim of sexual exploitation as both “a petite
16-year-old girl” and “a prostitute”); see also Larry Neumeister, Lawrence
Taylor Wins Case Brought by Teen Alleging Sexual Assault in New York Hotel,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/26/
lawrence-taylor-wins-case-teen-sexual-assault_n_2025289.html (using the term
“underage prostitute”); Laura Italiano, Former Sportscaster Marvell Scott
Pleads Guilty in Child Prostitute Case, N.Y. POST (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://nypost.com/2011/08/16/former-sportscaster-marvell-scott-pleads-guiltyin-child-prostitute-case/ (referring to victim as “child prostitute”).
18
See, e.g., The Associated Press, Father and Son Pimps Are Sentenced to
3
to
9
Years
in
Prison,
N.Y. TIMES
(July
8,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/nyregion/father-and-son-pimps-aresentenced-to-3-to-9-years-in-prison.html?_r=0. The MTV series Pimp My Ride
even uses the term “pimp” as a verb meaning improvement in the context of
turning “clunker” cars into “masterpieces.” Pimp My Ride: About Pimp My
Ride, MTV, http://www.mtv.com/shows/pimp_my_ride/season_5/series.jhtml
(last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (follow “Read Full Summary”).
19
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC) also encompasses
“child pornography, online enticement, [and] child sex tourism.” Office of
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and legal scholars have adopted the term CSEC to describe the
exploitation of children not just by sexual traffickers, but also by
adults who purchase sexual services, or otherwise recruit youth to
participate in the sex industry.20 The term “child prostitute,”
though widely used in popular media,21 is problematic. The
Department of Justice notes that the label “prostitute” perpetuates
misinformed ideas: “[u]sing the term prostitution in connection
with children . . . implies the idea of choice, when in fact that is not
the case.”22 The real danger is that the term “child prostitute”
evokes an idea that CSEC “is somehow different from other forms
of rape or sexual abuse of minors”—a more acceptable one.23
Rachel Lloyd, the founder of the non-profit Girls Educational and
Mentoring Services (GEMS), which serves trafficked girls,
illustrates how the “prostitute” label can serve to justify an adult’s
decision to buy sex from a child: “[m]any of these men wouldn’t
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Commercial Sexual Exploitation
of Children, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last visited Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/csec_program.html. For the purposes of
charging johns with statutory rape, this Note limits CSEC to “juveniles who
perform sexual acts in exchange for money, drugs, food or shelter.” CURTIS ET
AL., supra note 3, at 1. The forced prostitution of children has also been referred
to as “minor sex trafficking.” Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, FLORIDA
COUNCIL AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (last visited Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.fcasv.org/child-sexual-abuse/domestic-minor-sex-trafficking.
20
See R ICHARD J. E STES & N EIL A LAN W EINER , U. P A . S CH . OF S OC .
W ORK , T HE C OMMERCIAL S EXUAL E XPLOITATION OF C HILDREN IN THE U.S.,
C ANADA , AND M EXICO 2 (2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/sextrade/upenncsec90701.pdf.
21
The mainstream media commonly refer to the CSEC problem as child or
juvenile “prostitution.” See HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT FOR GIRLS & THE RABEN
GROUP, USE OF THE PHRASE “CHILD PROSTITUTE” IN THE MEDIA 1 (2013),
available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/807686_acbe2dfa7dde42a89c716f556
a1b12fe.pdf (citing over 5,000 instances in the last 5 years when reporters have
used the term “child prostitute” or “child prostitution”). See generally supra note
17 (providing examples of the media referring to underage victims of sexual
exploitation as prostitutes).
22
Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, The Prostitution of Children,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/
prostitution.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
23
H UMAN R IGHTS P ROJECT FOR G IRLS, supra note 21.
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dream of sexually abusing their daughters, but when it comes to a
‘prostitute’ . . . they figure it doesn’t really matter.”24
B. Prostituted People and Prostitution
This Note will refer to adults who sell their own sexual
services as “prostituted people” and “prostituted women.”
Referring to adults engaged in the sex industry as
“prostituted” reflects that a large majority of women in prostitution
wish to exit the commercial sex industry.25 Moreover, control over
their work is minimal: of the people who sell sex, 80% are under
the control of a pimp or trafficker.26 Although there are legitimate
reasons to argue that adults who sell sex have more autonomy than
children, the majority of those who sell sex experience force,
coercion, and violence just as their minor counterparts do.27
This Note will refer to “prostitution” as one aspect of the
commercial sex industry or the sex trade.28 Prostitution refers to
“the act or practice of engaging in sexual activity for money or its
equivalent.”29
24

Rachel Lloyd, Girls Like Us: Johns – The Men Who Buy Sex, FAIR
OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.fairobserver.com/article/girls-like-isjohns-men-who-buy-sex (reprinting an excerpt from Lloyd’s book, GIRLS LIKE
US). “The term ‘teenage prostitution’ also overlooks the legal status of minors
who have greater legal protections regarding sexual conduct because of their
emotional and physical immaturity and the need to protect them from
exploitative adults.” JAY ALBANESE, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., COMMERCIAL
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT DO WE
DO ABOUT IT? 8 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/215733.pdf.
25
See, e.g., SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (citing one study’s finding
that “88% of a sample of [women in] commercial sex in San Francisco reported
a desire to leave prostitution”) (citations omitted).
26
Id. at 13.
27
Id.
28
The commercial sex industry encompasses other trades that profit
from sex, such as strip clubs, and pornography. See Sex Trafficking in the
U.S., POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/sextrafficking-in-the-us (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) .
29
63C AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 1 (2013); see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-5613 (2013) (“An individual is guilty of prostitution when he or she .
. . engages in or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct, or sexual contact
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C. Sex Trafficking
This Note will refer to any involuntary sale of sex, and any sale
of sex by a child, as sex trafficking. Further, this Note will use the
term “trafficker,” rather than “pimp,” to connote an adult who has
induced a child to sell sex. Where this Note does use the term
“pimp,” it relates to situations where adults are engaged in
prostitution and coercion appears to be absent. “Trafficking” is a
term that “seems to connote movement[,]” yet the criminal activity
behind the term “trafficking” lies not in transporting victims across
international borders, state boundaries, or even towns, but in the
force and lack of choice involved.30 The federal Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines sex trafficking in two
forms: first, when “a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud
or coercion”; and second, when a child—someone under 18 years
of age—is induced to perform a commercial sex act.31
D. Johns
This Note will use the term “johns” to describe people who buy
sex, both from adults and from children. Both law enforcement
officials and academic researchers use this term.32 Some state laws
refer to johns as “patrons” and “customers” of prostitution, and
“patronizing a prostitute” is the most common term to describe a
person who buys sex.33 GEMS founder Rachel Lloyd notes that
with another person in return for a fee . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-101302(1) (West 2013) (“An individual is guilty of prostitution when . . . the
individual engages in sexual activity with another individual for a fee.”).
30
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Pers., What Is Modern
Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2014) (describing forced labor, sexual exploitation, or
involuntary domestic servitude as forms of trafficking); see also Child
Exploitation & Obscenity Section, supra note 22 (“Under federal law, a child
does not need to be moved across international or even state borders to be
considered a victim of commercial sexual exploitation.”).
31
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Chapt. 78, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A)
(2014). A “commercial sex act” is “any sex act on account of which anything of
value is given to or received by any person.” Id. § 7102(4).
32
See generally SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8.
33
63C AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 14 (2014).
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labeling men who buy sex from children as “johns” fails to capture
that they are rapists and child abusers, evoking instead an
“anonymous ‘everyman.’”34 With a lack of superior alternatives,
though, this Note uses the term “johns” to encompass all people
who buy sex, including women, despite the term’s gendered
association.35
E. Statutory Rape
This Note uses the term “statutory rape” to refer to the crime of
an adult (a person over eighteen years of age) having sex with a
child (a person under eighteen years of age)36—because a child is
legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity.37 Statutory rape
is a strict liability crime; neither force nor knowledge of the
victim’s age is an element of the offense.38 Jurisdictions have used
the terms sexual battery, sexual abuse, and rape in the second
degree to connote statutory rape.39 While most states strictly
34

Rachel Lloyd, Girls Like Us: Johns – The Men Who Buy Sex, FAIR
OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.fairobserver.com/article/girls-like-isjohns-men-who-buy-sex (reprinting an excerpt from Lloyd’s book, GIRLS LIKE
US). Girls Educational Mentoring Services (GEMS) is a non-profit started by
Ms. Lloyd to get CSEC survivors out of “the life” and to rebuild their lives. See
Mission and History, GEMS, http://www.gems-girls.org/about/mission-history
(last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
35
Indeed, a New York City study of children in CSEC found that 11% of
the CSEC girls interviewed, and 40% of the CSEC boys interviewed, had sold
sex to a female john. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 79.
36
For purposes of statutory rape, though, criminal statutes typically set the
age maximum of “child” at a few years below 18, such as 16 years old instead.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(1) (2013) (“Rape is . . . the penetration .
. . of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening . . . [w]here the female is under the age of
sixteen (16) years and the perpetrator is eighteen (18) years of age or older.”);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2013) (“No person shall engage in a sexual
act with a child who is under the age of 16 . . . .”).
37
TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“A child of tender years is deemed
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse; therefore, the child’s apparent
‘consent’ is immaterial.”) (citations omitted).
38
See id. § 285 n. 23 (“It is no defense that the defendant did not know the
female’s age or reasonably believed her to be of the age of consent . . . . [And]
force is not an element of statutory rape.”) (citations omitted).
39
See id. § 285 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2)(a) (West 2013)
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criminalize sex with a child below a certain age—typically twelve
to fourteen years old40—a majority of states also have provisions
decriminalizing consensual teenage sex (like that between Nina
and her boyfriend) by requiring that the offender be a certain
number of years older than the victim.41
This Note seeks to both educate readers and promote social
change. Using the correct terms with which victims, practitioners,
and the public can identify CSEC is the first important step in
accomplishing those purposes. Moreover, correct terminology
encourages an informed dialogue about the realities of children
forced into the commercial sex industry and the johns who buy sex
from them.
II.

COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: THE
LEGAL TREATMENT AND THE REALITY

Behind the prosecution of a child for prostitution often lies a
history of coercion, violence, and vulnerability. Most state law
enforcement agencies have failed to appreciate not only that
children forced to sell sex have a history of trauma, but also that
johns and traffickers continually violate these children physically,
mentally, and economically in order to trap them in the
commercial sex industry.42 Yet, the justice system continues to

(listing “sexual battery” as a capital offense on a victim less than 12 years old))
(additionally citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 254(1)(A) (2014) (defining
“sexual abuse of a minor” as “engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person . . .
who is either 14 or 15 years of age and the actor is at least 5 years older than the
other person”)); see also, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(1) (McKinney 2014)
(“A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when . . . being eighteen years
old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less
than fifteen years old . . . .”). These terms, however, are not exhaustive.
40
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a)(2) (West 2013) (defining
sexual assault in the first degree as sexual intercourse with a victim less than 13
years old, and an actor more than two years older than the victim).
41
See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285. For instance, in Connecticut, if the
victim is between the ages of 13 and 16 years, the defendant must be more than
three years older than the victim to be found guilty of sexual assault in the
second degree. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 (West 2013).
42
See Annitto, supra note 9, at 14; Godsoe, supra note 16.
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criminalize the acts of child victims;43 and neglects to criminalize
the acts of johns.44 If law enforcement bodies instead focused their
efforts on arresting and charging johns with statutory rape, johns
would likely be deterred; thus those who promote CSEC would
have little reason to kidnap children and beat them into
submission.
A.

Victim Characteristics and Entry into “The Life”

CSEC victims like Vivian are manipulated, beaten, and
traumatized while in the sex trade.45 They are also significantly
more likely than other children to have been physically abused,
sexually abused, and neglected before their sexual exploitation.46
Among all CSEC victims, 90% had experienced some form of
abuse—physical, sexual, or a combination of both—before their
exploitation.47 The onset of sexual exploitation often begins with
someone the child knows. In the United States, “it is more
common for children to be sexually exploited for monetary gain by
family and friends” than by strangers, and that exploitation begins
with a family member or friend sexually abusing the child.48
Poverty powerfully contributes to a child’s risk of being
sexually exploited.49 This risk increases dramatically for children
from poor families that are “highly dysfunctional”—families that
have suffered from parental breakup, parental or relative substance
abuse, and histories of physical or sexual abuse.50 Children from
middle-class families who run away from home also often fall prey
43

See Godsoe, supra note 16.
See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.
45
See Annitto, supra note 9, at 14; Godsoe, supra note 16.
46
K RISTIN M. F INKLEA ET AL., C ONG . R ESEARCH S ERV ., 7-5700,
R41878, S EX T RAFFICKING OF C HILDREN IN THE U NITED S TATES : O VERVIEW
AND I SSUES FOR C ONGRESS 7 (2011), available at http://ecpatusa.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/CRS-Report-R41878_sex-trafficking-of-children.pdf.
47
Id. Researchers have concluded that CSEC victims had experienced child
sexual abuse at a disproportionate rate, ranging from 21% to 42%, while in the
general population these figures are only 1% to 3%. Id.
48
ALBANESE, supra note 24, at 1.
49
See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 3.
50
Id. at 3, 44.
44
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to sexual victimization.51 Selling sex becomes a method of
survival, as when payment comes in the form of food or a place to
sleep.52 Children may have a myriad of reasons for running away
from home, but CSEC victims cited sexual assault by someone
they knew as the primary reason.53
A breakdown of CSEC statistics demonstrates that, like
poverty, race and gender are compounding factors for children’s
victimization. A New York City study in 2008 revealed the stark
racial disparities in CSEC: children of color comprised a much
larger portion of CSEC victims than that of the general
population.54 African-American youth comprised one quarter of
the CSEC population; Latina/o youth another quarter; and multiracial youth who did not identify exclusively as African-American
or Latina/o the final quarter of children of color in New York
City.55 Whites also comprised only a quarter of New York City
CSEC victims; but, according to the most recent census data,
whites make up forty-four percent of New York City’s general
population.56
Despite the perception that all child trafficking victims are
girls, almost half of child trafficking victims in the United States
are boys.57 In the United States, the average age of entry into
CSEC is between eleven and fourteen years old.58 Minority boys
and girls enter CSEC even earlier,59 while transgender60 youth are
51

See Urbina, supra note 17.
Id. See also ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 3.
53
See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 52.
54
CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 42.
55
Id.
56
Id. See also U.S. Census Bureau, State & Country QuickFacts: New York
(city),
New
York
(2010),
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
COMMERCE,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2014).
57
ECPAT-USA, AND BOYS TOO 4 (2013). The ECPAT study found that
trafficked boys received less attention because young men often would not
identify as involved with CSEC due to shame or stigma, and prostituted males
are seen as having more agency and choice. Id. at 5.
58
ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 92. Boys entered CSEC, on average,
one year earlier than girls. Id.
59
Id.
60
“Transgender” refers to a person who was born with sexual organs
52
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the last to enter.61 However, transgender youth are more likely than
any other population to engage in survival sex—exchanging sex
for shelter or food—because they are also more likely to be living
on the streets.62
Regardless of race, gender, or other socioeconomic
circumstances, many children are forced or lured into commercial
sexual exploitation in one of two ways: traffickers searching for
children, or johns directly propositioning youth for sex. When
traffickers bring children into the sex trade, they frequent familiar
haunts of desperate young boys and girls: “bus stations, malls,
arcades, and on the Internet.”63 Then, traffickers “ensnare” their
victims by building up their self-esteem, and then shattering it—by
taunting, beating, and harassing them.64 Take Shaneiqua’s story,
for example:
Shaneiqua was an A student. When she was twelve
a man approached her and told her she was “mad
cute.” She was flattered. He took her out to dinner,
and treated her like his girlfriend, what Shaneiqua
called “the honeymoon period” (two weeks). One
day, he turned to her and said that he loved her.
Then he revealed that he was a “pimp.” He said that
he would love her a lot more if she brought in
money to the relationship. After she had sex for
money, her “whole body just felt dead.” So she ran
away to her friend’s house. Her “pimp” was already
outside. He told her her behavior in “wanting to be
opposite of their gender identification. See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at
72.
61
CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 42. However, the researchers note that
since the number of transgender youth they interviewed was so small, their later
age of entry could be a statistical anomaly within their sampling. Id.
62
See id. Further, researchers concluded that law enforcement and service
personnel are indifferent or even caustic towards transgender youth—as
transgender people are largely castigated and discriminated against in society
overall. See id. at 187. Without the aid of police enforcement, or the help of
social services, transgender youth remain on the streets, plunging them further
into dependence on the sex industry. See id.
63
Annitto, supra note 9, at 13. Boys, on the other hand, are more likely to
“act alone, rather than under a pimp arranging their exploitation.” Id. at 11–12.
64
Id. at 13.
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a child,” and running away was not allowed. Then,
he started anally raping her. She felt like the rapes
were her fault—she shouldn’t have wanted a
childhood; she shouldn’t have disobeyed him.
Finally, she felt like her body belonged to him.65
What Shaneiqua’s trafficker subjected her to is akin to both
“grooming” by child sexual predators, and the control honed by
domestic abusers through “isolation, economic dependence, and
physical and verbal abuse.”66 The offers of a trafficker might
appeal to vulnerable children who have run away from trouble at
home or have been ostracized and abused by their families,
because what traffickers have to offer seems “better than what the
group homes and the shelter system seem[] to offer.”67
Children frequently become victims of CSEC when johns
approach them in the street. About a quarter of children in CSEC
interviewed for the 2008 New York City study noted that their
entry began with a stranger’s direct proposition of sex in exchange
for money, food, or shelter.68 Many of the CSEC victims whose
entry began with a john’s proposition cited “being homeless” as
their reason for agreeing.69 The frequency with which johns
directly proposition youth highlights the need to criminalize those
who create the demand for commercial sex, and not only the
traffickers who supply it.
B. Emerging Sex Trafficking Statutes
As anti-trafficking advocates have brought to light stories like
Shaneiqua’s, states have begun adopting human trafficking statutes
65

This is a narrative adaptation of Shaneiqua’s telling of her story in the
film, Very Young Girls, a documentary made about girls with whom Girls
Educational and Mentoring Services (GEMS) has worked in New York City.
VERY YOUNG GIRLS (Swinging T Productions 2007).
66
Annitto, supra note 9, at 14.
67
CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 47. Traffickers lure young girls with
promises of “distant places” and “employment and money.” DAVID FINKELHOR
& RICHARD ORMROD, PROSTITUTION OF JUVENILES: PATTERNS FROM NIBRS 2
(2004).
68
See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 48–49.
69
Id. at 49.
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that mirror the language of the federal Trafficking Victims
Protection Act.70 The Polaris Project, a legal advocacy group that
pushes for stronger federal and state laws to combat human
trafficking and aid victims, created a compilation of human
trafficking laws by state.71 The results reveal a patchwork of state
laws, where penalties for traffickers and johns vary considerably,
and CSEC victims may remain criminalized. The Polaris Project
ranks each state into one of four tiers72 depending on the strength
of its human trafficking laws—whether the laws both punish
traffickers and support survivors effectively.73
According to the study, some states fully recognize trafficked
persons as victims and traffickers as criminals, while others fail to
identify the crime of trafficking at all. In the top tier, New Jersey
and Washington received high marks for enacting sweeping
legislation to deal with human trafficking.74 Among New Jersey’s
accomplishments were: lowering the burden of proof for the
offense of sex trafficking of minors;75 enacting a safe harbor law
that can grant minors immunity from prosecution for prostitution
offenses or initiate diversion proceedings (social services as
opposed to punishment) from juvenile sentencing procedures; and

70

22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (West 2013). Some states have adopted language
similar to the federal statute, or have even widened its reach. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8 (2013) (“A person commits the crime of human
trafficking if he . . . knowingly holds, recruits, lures, entices, harbors, transports,
provides or obtains, by any means, another, to engage in sexual activity . . . or to
provide labor or services . . . .”).
71
2013 State Ratings on Human Trafficking Laws, POLARIS PROJECT
(2013),
http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/nationalpolicy/state-ratings-on-human-trafficking-laws [hereinafter POLARIS PROJECT,
2013 State Ratings].
72
The rankings are similar to the tiered system of the annual Trafficking in
Persons Report produced by the United States Department of State. See U.S.
STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
73
POLARIS PROJECT, 2013 State Ratings, supra note 71.
74
Id.
75
The lower burden of proof entails, consistent with the federal code, that
the elements of “force, fraud, and coercion” do not need to be proven when a
minor has been trafficked. See id.
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training of law enforcement in human trafficking.76 In the bottom
tier, however, South Dakota received the lowest marks for “not
making minimal efforts to enact a basic legal framework to combat
human trafficking.”77 The inconsistent state treatment of victims
and perpetrators of human trafficking reveals the need to
criminalize the johns.
Further, even the most robust state anti-trafficking laws have
serious setbacks in their application. Anti-trafficking laws should
prevent minors from being prosecuted for prostitution and mandate
specialized services—such as immediate safe housing placement,
or enrollment in a mentorship program—when such children have
encountered law enforcement whether by arrest or rescue.78
Unfortunately, these laws have their limits. For example, New
York’s Safe Harbor Act carries “a presumption that a child who is
charged with a prostitution offense is a victim of a severe form of
trafficking under the TVPA”—but this presumption transpires in
court only after a prosecutor has already charged the child with a
crime.79 Additionally, this presumption appears to be rebuttable:
courts retain discretion to continue the prosecution of a child for
juvenile prostitution if the child had been previously convicted of a
prostitution offense or is unwilling “to cooperate with specialized
services . . . .”80
A legislative exception to treating CSEC children as victims is
but one of the many hurdles in a child’s path to recovering from
“the life.”81 Certainly legislators could rectify trafficking statutes’
76

Id.
Id.
78
Sex Trafficking of Minors and “Safe Harbor”, POLARIS PROJECT,
http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/assisting-victims/
safe-harbor (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
79
Marihueg Cedeño, Note, Pimps, Johns, and Juvenile Prostitutes: Is New
York Doing Enough to Combat the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of
Children?, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 173 (2012) (emphasis added).
80
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (McKinney 2013). Despite this glaring
exception, New York is still faring better than many other states—it had a Tier 1
rating from Polaris’ analysis. POLARIS PROJECT, 2013 State Ratings, supra note
71.
81
Exploited children refer to their exploitation—the abuse, the money,
even the love for their exploiter—as “the life.” See, e.g., VERY YOUNG GIRLS,
supra note 65.
77
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exceptions to prosecuting CSEC victims. Yet changing the law
requires drafting, organizing, support, fundraising, advocacy, and
convincing legislators that your cause is worthy.82 Needless to say,
legislative changes are uphill battles without definite outcomes.83
This Note proposes a shift in enforcement as an alternative to the
long road of new legislation. Specifically, it argues that
prosecutors should use the offense of statutory rape, which is
already at the law’s disposal, to prosecute people who buy sex
from children. This change would properly treat prostituted
children as victims and perpetrators as criminals.
C.

Why the Criminalization of Children Persists

In order to comprehend why even the most well-intentioned
legislative fixes have not worked, it is important to understand why
police and prosecutors continue to arrest and prosecute children for
juvenile prostitution. It is troubling that the criminal justice system
would criminalize child victims who are not only legally incapable
of consenting to sex, but who are threatened, beaten, and coerced
into “the life” by predatory adults. This injustice persists for a few
reasons:84 (1) typical prostitution laws85 do not explicitly address
82

See, e.g., How a Bill Becomes a Law, N.Y. STATE SENATE,
http://www.nysenate.gov/How_a-Bill_Becomes_a_Law (last visited Sept. 15,
2014). Federal trafficking legislation was first passed over a decade ago, and
states are just beginning to follow suit. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, ch.
78, (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7113 (2014)).
83
There is some indication that bill passage has become even more difficult
in the federal government in recent history. See Christopher Ingraham,
Congressional Gridlock Has Doubled Since the 1950s, WASH. POST (May 28,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2014/05/28/congressional-gridlock-has-doubled-since-the-1950s/.
84
A variety of sources indicated a host of reasons for the criminalization of
CSEC victims. See generally Godsoe, supra note 16. What is listed are the
practical reasons for why the criminal justice system continues to prosecute and
punish children who would otherwise be considered victims under the law. One
impractical reason worth noting is that some proponents of criminalizing
juvenile prostitution believe that these children are “bad” and deserve to be
punished. See, e.g., In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 826–27 (Tex. 2010)
(Wainwright, J., dissenting) (calling B.W.’s prostitution act “distressing
conduct,” her history of troubles “delinquent conduct,” and her nature that of a
“violent” and “chronic runaway”).
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the age of the person selling sex, and thus permit the prosecution
of minors; (2) the “prostitutes” are easier to identify and get off the
streets than traffickers and johns in efforts to criminalize and deter
prostitution; (3) police and prosecutors wish to secure
“cooperation” (e.g., testimony or leads) from victimized children
in criminal proceedings against their trafficker; and (4) law
enforcement authorities believe that the prosecution of children is
the only way to protect them from the harms of prostitution.86
Each of these justifications is—on some level—unsettling, given
the coercion and manipulation that CSEC victims have already
suffered. However, recognizing the justifications for criminalizing
CSEC victims is necessary in order to understand the challenges of
criminalizing the commercial sex industry, and to understand how
the significant role of johns in this criminal enterprise has been
woefully overlooked.
D. Prostitution Laws Have No Minimum Age Requirement
Recall the “presumption” exception in many safe harbor laws,
which leave children prosecuted for prostitution because state laws
do not have age minima for prostitution offenses.87 Judges across
the country have disputed whether legislators intended for
prostitution statutes to apply to children in the absence of age
minima. One New York case involved a twelve year-old criminal
defendant named Nicolette R., who shared many of the
characteristics of typical CSEC victims, such as Vivian and
Shaneiqua: she “suffered sexual abuse and abandonment by her
85

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(D) (2013). The Ohio law
states, “‘Prostitute’ means a male or female who promiscuously engages in
sexual activity for hire . . . .” Id. The definition of a prostitute, and attendant
statutes contain no age limits or minima. See Id. §§ 2907.01, 2907.21–25.
86
See generally Godsoe, supra note 16.
87
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.030(1) (2014) (“A person is guilty
of prostitution if such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual
conduct with another person in return for a fee.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00
(McKinney 2014) (“A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages
or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for
a fee.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02 (West 2014) (“A person commits an
offense [of prostitution] if the person knowingly . . . offers to engage, agrees to
engage, or engages in sexual conduct for a fee . . . .”).
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parents,” and after running away from the abuse, she “came under
the control of an adult male pimp and was forced into
prostitution.”88 Medical examinations revealed that she bore many
“scars, burns, and other wounds.”89 Yet, a family court judge
convicted Nicolette R. of juvenile prostitution.90 When Nicolette
R. appealed her conviction, she argued that her youth rendered her
incapable of consenting, and thus she could not be prosecuted for
having “offered to perform oral sex on an undercover police officer
for forty dollars.”91 The court rejected her argument that she could
not consent to sex, deciding rather that her consent to prostitution
was immaterial.92 The court failed to reconcile the statutory
paradox, and stated:
Although appellant . . . would have been deemed
. . . incapable of consenting to any sexual act
rendered unlawful by Penal Law article 130 [a
provision dealing with lack of consent in sex
offenses], this circumstance was irrelevant to the
issue of whether she was properly found to have
committed an act, which if committed by an adult,
would constitute the crime of prostitution.93
Other courts, however, have read statutory rape laws in
conjunction with prostitution offenses, finding that prosecutors
have no grounds on which to charge a minor with prostitution. For
example, in a Texas Supreme Court decision that examined similar
facts,94 the court could not hide its bewilderment at the state’s
inclination to prosecute exploited children: “[i]t is difficult to
reconcile the Legislature’s recognition of the special vulnerability
of children, and its passage of laws for their protection, with an
intent . . . to consider children quasi-criminal offenders guilty of an
act that necessarily involves their own sexual exploitation.”95
Unfortunately, the decision only protects children under the age of
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Annitto, supra note 9, at 34–35 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
See In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d 270, 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
Annitto, supra note 9, at 34 (citing In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d at 270).
See id.
In re Nicolette R., 9 A.D.3d at 271.
See Annitto, supra note 9, at 35–36.
In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 821–22 (Tex. 2010).
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fourteen96 because it applies only to the highest offense of statutory
rape under Texas’s “two-tier statutory rape” paradigm.97 Under
this paradigm, children in Texas would be immune from
prosecution only if they were thirteen years old or younger at the
time of the charged offense (the first-tier law), while the fate of
children between fourteen and seventeen years old would be left to
the whims of prosecutors and judges (the second-tier law).98 The
disparate outcomes in New York and Texas reveal the power that
judicial discretion can wield over children, and the judicial
system’s failure when children are criminalized in a vacuum,
without considering johns’ culpability.
E. Arresting Prostituted Children is Easier
Second, in efforts to reduce prostitution, law enforcement
officials justify arresting children for prostitution by citing the
difficulty of catching and convicting johns and pimps. This
justification for arresting children—that it is a way of eradicating
the commercial sex industry—relies on the same theories for
arresting adults: prostituted people who are prosecuted are usually
convicted;99 prostituted people working on the street are
supposedly highly visible, unlike johns and pimps/traffickers;100
and decoy arrests of johns are more likely to engender entrapment
96

See Annitto, supra note 9, at 34.
Id. at 37 (noting that the decision rested on Texas strictly criminalizing
an adult engaging in sex with a child under the age of fourteen, but that defenses
were available to offenders who had sex with children fourteen years of age or
older).
98
See id.
99
See M ICHAEL S. S COTT , O FFICE OF C MTY . O RIENTED P OLICING
S ERVS ., P ROBLEM -O RIENTED G UIDES FOR P OLICE S ERIES N O . 2: S TREET
P ROSTITUTION 17 (2002).
100
See Sex Workers at Risk: Summary, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 19,
2012), http://www.hrw.org/node/108771/section/2. For instance, the practice of
using condoms as evidence to enforce prostitution laws has lead to increased
profiling of transgender women and women of color on the street. Id. “Police
stops and searches for condoms are often a result of profiling, a practice of
targeting individuals as suspected offenders for who they are, what they are
wearing and where they are standing, rather than on the basis of any observed
illegal activity.” Id.
97
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defenses—that the police induced the defendant to commit a
crime.101 Due to these vulnerabilities to arrest, prostituted people
have been characterized as “low hanging fruit” whose arrest and
conviction can demonstrate law enforcement officials’
commitment to quash prostitution and its attendant social ills.102
The arrest disparity between prostituted children and johns is stark:
“more than ten times as many minors were arrested for prostitution
as were customers for solicitation of minor prostitutes over a
twenty-five year period in New York City.”103 The hope that
arresting prostituted minors would reduce both their level of
recidivism and prostitution in general was short-lived.104 In one
New York City study, for example, the average CSEC victim had
been arrested 2.5 times.105 Another study, a guide for state law
enforcement on effectively policing prostitution, determined that
arresting prostituted persons—adult or minor—was ineffective in
stemming the prostitution industry, as arrests and convictions were
fruitless deterrents.106 The “it’s easy” justification for arresting
prostituted minors is not only harmful to children, it is also
unsuccessful as both a specific and general deterrence strategy to
prostitution. Despite compelling evidence to the contrary, law
enforcement cling to the idea that arresting children for their own
exploitation somehow furthers the larger pursuit of eliminating
prostitution.
F. Prosecution of Children to Induce Cooperation
Third, police officers and prosecutors hold over child victims
the threat of prosecution in order to induce their cooperation in
criminal proceedings against their traffickers. Opponents of the
decriminalization of juvenile prostitution believe that “an exploited
101

SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17.
Godsoe, supra note 16 (“[B]ecause it is easier to prosecute prostitutes
than pimps, police and prosecutors are simply focusing on the ‘low hanging
fruit’ to keep their numbers up, rather than actually pursuing the most culpable
offenders or changing the system.”).
103
Id. (citations omitted).
104
See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 89.
105
Id.
106
SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17.
102
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youth . . . can . . . perhaps be persuaded to provide information
against his or her pimp.”107 Indeed, prosecutors in New York City
opposed proposals to decriminalize prostitution because they
believed the threat of prosecution over juveniles was necessary to
secure testimony against their traffickers.108 Though advancing the
criminalization of traffickers is a valid objective, the ends do not
justify the means. Coercing children’s cooperation by threatening a
prostitution charge is akin to threatening a victim of domestic
violence with a disorderly conduct charge if she refuses to testify
against her attacker. Twisting the law into a tool for intimidation
makes police and prosecutors complicit in a pattern of coercion alltoo-familiar and haunting to CSEC victims.
G. Prosecution of Children to Protect Them
Finally, some practitioners in the criminal justice system
believe that prosecuting child victims for prostitution is the only
way to “protect minors from their own behavior.”109 In addition,
some law enforcement officials who are aware of CSEC believe
that prosecuting child victims is the only adequate means of
protecting victims not from themselves, but from their
traffickers.110 Professor Cynthia Godsoe, a legal scholar on
children and the law, argued that the latter concern is legitimate,
and many officers “may feel that their hands are tied” since they
cannot “detain [a child victim] securely . . . without a criminal
charge.”111 Officers worry that these children will be “wooed or
threatened back into the life by a pimp.”112
107

Annitto, supra note 9, at 27.
Godsoe, supra note 16 (citations omitted). Godsoe indicates that New
York City prosecutors legitimately believe they need threats because these “girls
are flight risks” due to their history of running away, the fear of their “pimp,” or
even their love for him. Id.
109
Annitto, supra note 9, at 27.
110
Godsoe, supra note 16 (stating that minors are confined to ensure that
they are “housed” away from their pimps).
111
Id. (citations omitted).
112
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). One police officer empathically
asked, “How do you keep them safe once you find them?” Id. (citations
omitted).
108
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With insufficient social services available to trafficked
children, many police officers feel that incarceration is their only
recourse to protect children from further exploitation.113 While
these concerns merit sympathy, in reality incarcerating CSEC
victims only serves to further isolate and harm a population whom
adults have continually abused and mistreated. Children arrested
for juvenile prostitution may be more likely to return to “the life”
once they receive a criminal record, as their criminal history leaves
them ashamed to return to their families or destitute of
employment opportunities outside of the commercial sex
industry.114 The significant harms that result from criminalizing
CSEC victims outweigh any proffered practical reasons. The goals
of punishing these victims remain still unfulfilled, necessitating a
change in enforcement and treatment.
(ADULT) PROSTITUTION: “THE OLDEST OPPRESSION”115

III.

The market for adult prostitution creates and reinforces the
market for child sex trafficking. A sweeping University of
Pennsylvania study on child sex trafficking across the United
States, Canada, and Mexico concluded that “the presence of preexisting adult prostitution markets in communities where large
numbers of street youth are concentrated” is the second most cited
reason for the rise of CSEC.116 The study identified several reasons
113

See id.
See id. (quoting police and prosecutors who admit frustration about the
“‘revolving door’ of arrest and incarceration” for child “prostitutes”).
115
Prostitution is often referred to as “the world’s oldest profession.” See
Forrest Wickman, Is Prostitution Really the World’s Oldest Profession?, SLATE
(Mar.
6,
2012,
5:57
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/explainer/2012/03/rush_limbaugh_calls_sandra_fluke_a_pro
stitute_is_prostitution_really_the_world_s_oldest_profession_.html. Prostitution
as “the oldest oppression” was coined by feminist, abolitionist advocates. See,
e.g., Julie Bindel, Eradicate the Oldest Oppression, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17,
2006),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/jan/
18/ukcrime.prisonsandprobation. See generally, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, THE
PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 11 (1995) (providing an example of how the term
can be used to question subjugation of sexuality).
116
ESTES & WEINER, supra note 20, at 2. Among the cited reasons for the
creation of child sex trafficking, the existence of adult prostitution markets was
114
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why the presence of an adult prostitution market would generate
one for children: (1) an adult market is already well-known to
“local and transient males,” enabling those interested in children to
use the market for preying on children for sex; (2) adult markets
occur most commonly in communities with drugs and cheap hotel
rooms, which are also conducive to a child market; (3) police
enforcement of prostitution is low in such poor communities; and
(4) adult markets already create anonymity for exploiters, and
subsequently for the children who are brought into exploitation.117
The intrinsically oppressive nature of the child prostitution
market becomes more comprehensible when examined through the
lens of the adult prostitution market, where pimps and traffickers
use a host of similar tactics to induce adults to sell sex, as they
would children. Further, there are few differences between johns
who buy sex from children and johns who buy sex from adults.118
Therefore, the solution that this Note proposes—holding johns
accountable for the harms they inflict on children—hinges on
analyzing the commercial sex industry as a whole.
A. Characteristics
of
Prostitutes:
Circumstances and Victimization

Socioeconomic

There are important distinctions between prostituted people
who control the sexual services they sell and those who are under
the control of a pimp or trafficker. Unsurprisingly, prostituted
people working for a pimp experience many of the same abuses as
children who are forced into the commercial sex industry.119
Generally, prostituted people who are not involved with pimps fare
better than their trafficker-controlled counterparts.120 Those under
the control of pimps “make the least money, [and] are more likely

second only to “the use of prostitution by runaway and thrownaway children to
provide for their subsistence needs.” Id.
117
Id. at 42.
118
There are, of course, johns who are specifically attracted to children, but
most johns who buy sex from children do not have this expressive desire. See
RACHEL LLOYD, GIRLS LIKE US 107 (Harper Collins, 1st ed. 2011).
119
See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.
120
Id.
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to be drug addicted, [and] subjected to violence . . . .”121 The
control of a pimp also means that these prostituted people “have
the least control over their workload, choice of ‘clients,’ and the
money earned.”122 Although the number of adults trafficked into
the commercial sex industry is uncertain, social science studies
suggest that “up to 80% of . . . women and girls serving as
prostitutes had been coerced or forced to engage in prostitution by
pimps or traffickers.”123 This number is a conservative estimate
when one accounts for the age of entry into prostitution, which is
often very young.124 On average, all prostituted people (adults and
children) enter prostitution between the ages of twelve and
sixteen—ages at which they would legally be considered a minor
victim of sex trafficking.125 Even for those people who are not
controlled by a trafficker, their entry into prostitution mostly likely
began in their childhood when they were incapable of choosing
such work.
Poor education, prior abuse, and economic desperation are the
factors that not only force prostituted people into the sex industry,
but also “conspire to keep them there.”126 Similar to victims of
CSEC, the greatest risks for adults entering prostitution are
“running away from home and homelessness.”127 Prostituted
persons are often unable to sustain themselves by any means other
than selling sex given “high levels of childhood truancy, poor
education, poor employment skills, and debt.”128 Like child victims
121

Id. (citations omitted). Prostitutes under the control of pimps were also
“more likely to have an inadequate education, to be chronically unemployed,
and to have been younger when they first had intercourse, tried drugs, and
engaged in prostitution.” Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
122
Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
123
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
124
The United States Code makes it a crime for someone to use a child “to
engage in a commercial sex act;” showing force, fraud, or coercion is not
necessary for proving the trafficking of children. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2013).
125
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 11 (citations omitted). Under the
United States Code, a child victim of sex trafficking is one who “has not
attained the age of 18 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2013).
126
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 11..
127
Id. at 12 (citations omitted). Prostitution is a method of last resort for
survival. Id. (citations omitted).
128
Id.

BUYER BEWARE

477

of CSEC, adults who are prostituted also experience a high
incidence of physical abuse—up to seventy-five percent—and
sexual abuse—up to eighty-two percent—before they enter
prostitution.129
Prostituted people continue to experience physical abuse,
sexual abuse, and a lack of economic independence once they enter
the commercial sex industry. Prostituted persons under the control
of a pimp do not earn nearly as much money as the pimp.130
Instead, the pimp retains between sixty and seventy percent of the
money that the prostituted person earned.131 Even under the
auspices of Nevada’s legal, regulated brothels discussed in Part B
below, prostituted people keep less than half of what they earn.132
Inequitable pay distribution, however, is a minor injustice
compared to prostituted persons’ deplorable working conditions
and treatment. In the United States, between seventy-three and
ninety-two precent of prostituted people have been raped in the
course of working in the commercial sex industry.133 Johns, pimps,
and traffickers commit most of these assaults.134 But prostituted
people are also much more likely than the average American to be
raped by a stranger, i.e. someone not buying sex or involved in the
industry, often because they must work in high-crime areas at late
hours.135
Further compounding their victimization, prostituted people

129

See id. For children of CSEC, up to 90% have experienced some form
of physical or sexual abuse. Finklea et al., supra note 46, at 7.
130
See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 14.
131
Id.
132
See Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, State-Sanctioned Sex:
Negotiating Formal and Informal Regulatory Practices in Nevada Brothels, 44
SOC. PERSP. 307, 326 (2001) (describing a prostituted person’s pay in Nevada’s
brothels as a “50/50 split” with the house, from which room and board, and
often tips for other staff are further subtracted). Nevada does not allow for
prostituted people to work independently of a brothel; thus, it is impossible for
these workers to break free of these conditions. See id. at 313; NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.354 (2013).
133
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 13 (citations omitted).
134
See id.
135
See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice
System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1362–63 (1997).
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rarely see their rapists convicted or even prosecuted.136 This failure
of the justice system is a product of prosecutors who refuse to
pursue the johns’ cases because of the high likelihood of acquittal;
and of judges who frequently admit evidence that the victim was a
prostitute in contravention of rape shield laws.137 Rape shield laws
prohibit evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual history because
such evidence would often serve only to embarrass and shame the
victim, rather than bear on the issue of consent.138 Many judges,
however, believe that prostitution bears not only on the issue of
consent, but also on a victim’s credibility.139 Once the victim’s
status as a prostituted person is admissible, juries believe that it is
impossible to rape a prostitute.140 An in-depth study of
prosecutors’ charging decisions for sexual assault cases found that
the realities of what would play out in the courtroom heavily
informed charging decisions.141 Prosecutors were averse to
bringing charges against an attacker who had raped a prostitute—
or even someone suspected of being a prostitute.142 Effectively, the
136

See id. at 1210–11, 1246, 1360.
Karin S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of
Admitting Prostitution Evidence under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1407 (2007). New York, for example, explicitly exempts
evidence of a victim’s prostitution conviction from the traditional bar to
admitting prior sexual conduct. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(2) (McKinney
2014).
138
See Portlock, supra note 137, at 1405–07.
139
Id. at 1405–06 (explaining that judges believe that excepting a woman’s
status as a prostitute as evidence is reasonable because it “bears on [her]
credibility . . . as a witness or . . . has a tendency to show [she] consented”). The
belief that prostituted people lack credibility harkens back to antiquated notions
of not being able to trust “loose” or “unchaste” women. See Michelle J.
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexual License: Sexual Consent and a
New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 75 (2002) (“[C]ourts
presumed that if a witness was unchaste, she had broken social mores already
and so was significantly more likely to continue to defy those mores by lying as
a witness under oath.”).
140
Portlock, supra note 137; see also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 135,
at 1360.
141
Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault:
Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 213, 218, 224
(1991).
142
Id.
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American justice system treats prostituted people—regardless of
their desire to be in the commercial sex industry or not—as
second-class citizens. To traffickers, they are property; to law
enforcement, they are criminals; and to the courts, they are not
worthy of the law’s protection even if they have experienced
inordinate violence. This biased view of prostituted people is so
powerful that even prostituted children do not benefit from the
legal protections they would routinely engender as minor victims
of any other crime.
B. Characteristics of Johns: People Who Buy Sex
Unlike their minor victims and prostituted adult counterparts—
who are often poor, runaway, and homeless people of color—johns
reflect the broader characteristics of adult society.143 The
commonalities among johns who buy sex from minors, or johns
who buy sex from adults, may end at their shared interest in paying
for sex; they are virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the
male144 population.145 A Boston psychology study on men who pay
for sex found that the johns spanned income levels; the bulk of
johns earned between $20,000 and $80,000 per year and 5% made
over $140,000 per year.146 The johns studied also varied widely in
143

See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7.
Although johns can be both men, women, and gender non-conforming
adults, this section discusses men because most research has delved into the
study of male johns, rather than johns of other genders. See, e.g., CURTIS ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 79 (describing a surprising number of female johns reported by
both male and female child victims).
145
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7 (“Studies of male consumers of
commercial sex find that buyers are similar to the general population in most
regards, and quite unlike most populations of criminal offenders, although the
population of johns also contains some dangerous criminals and sociopaths.”).
Despite demographic and socioeconomic diversity, johns do seem to share
“certain attitudes, life experiences, and behavioral tendencies that distinguish
them from their non-buying peers.” MELISSA FARLEY ET AL., PROSTITUTION
RESEARCH & EDUCATION, COMPARING SEX BUYERS AND MEN WHO DON’T BUY
SEX 4 (2011), available at http://prostitutionresearch.com/pub_author/melissafarley-and-emily-schuckman-and-jacqueline-m-golding-and-kristen-houser-andlaura-jarrett-and-peter-qualliotine-and-michele-decker/.
146
FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 12 tbl.3. Note that although Farley
144

480

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

age, from twenty to seventy-five years old.147 Their education
levels were commensurate with the general population: 44% had a
college or graduate degree.148 Finally, their race reflected
demographics in the United States: most were white.149 Further
studies have also revealed that over forty percent of johns are
married.150
While no study has focused exclusively on johns who either
knowingly or unknowingly buy sex from children, many studies
have concluded that most johns “are not specifically attracted to
children”—or at least, they do not realize that they are.151 Buying
sex from children is part of a larger demand for sexual experiences
with younger and younger prostituted persons. One study in
Chicago analyzed johns’ posts from the USA Sex Guide—an
online forum where johns could post about buying sex, an activity
johns named their “great hobby”—for three months in order to
understand the attitudes of people who buy sex.152 The Chicago
and her fellow researchers found that many aspects of their conclusions were
consistent with other studies of johns, the findings cited herein are from this
study alone. See, e.g., id. at 47 tbl. 17 (comparing Boston johns’ reactions to
deterrents to johns’ reactions in Boston, England, Chicago, and Scotland). This
study of johns has a fairly small regional scope: the metropolitan area of Boston,
Massachusetts, and thus its findings may not extrapolate to the entire population
of johns in the United States. See id. at 11 (noting that interviews occurred in a
“[c]entral Boston location”).
147
See id. at 12.
148
See id. at 13, tbl.4.
149
See id. at tbl.5.
150
See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7 (finding that 41% of johns were
married).
151
LLOYD, supra note 118, at 107 (“[V]iewing men who purchase children
and youth for sex as pedophiles leads to a sense that it is isolated behavior
among men who are ‘sick’ and ‘perverted.’ It allows us to overlook the fact that
most of the men doing the buying are what we would consider ‘normal.’”).
152
L ARA J ANSON ET AL., C HICAGO A LLIANCE A GAINST S EXUAL
E XPLOITATION , “O UR G REAT H OBBY ”: A N A NALYSIS OF O NLINE N ETWORKS
FOR B UYERS OF S EX IN I LLINOIS 2 (2013). Similar to Melissa Farley and her
colleagues’ research, researchers in the Chicago study limited their findings to a
discreet regional area: Illinois. See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 47 tbl. 17
(comparing Boston johns’ reactions to deterrents to johns’ reactions in Boston,
England, Chicago, and Scotland); JANSON ET AL., supra note 152 (noting that
the research focused on posts from johns who buy sex in Illinois). Thus, the

BUYER BEWARE

481

study found that an “overwhelming majority of [johns] . . . state a
preference for ‘young’ women.”153
Johns’ motivations for buying sex range from the desire “to
engage in sex acts that few other women are willing to engage in”
to the feeling “that most women find them unattractive.”154 Despite
this latter motivation, researchers found that all of the johns in their
study chose the words “player, stud, [or] powerful” to describe
men who buy sex.155 In addition to these expressed motivations,
probing revealed that johns’ underlying approbation for buying sex
derived from their “view of sex as a commodity and their sense of
entitlement to sexual access to women.”156 Thirty-two percent of
johns justified participating in the prostitution industry because
they believed it “reduces the likelihood of rape.”157
Aside from the belief that they have a right to use people for
sex on demand, johns are eminently aware of the harms adults and
children experience in the commercial sex industry. There are no
discernible differences between johns who have bought sex from
trafficked women and those who have bought sex from
independent sex workers—most likely because johns either do not
know or do not care how the person they are buying sex from came
into the trade.158 Many johns on the USA Sex Guide discussed how
prostituted “women”159 were not happy “when ‘performing’ for
Chicago study may suffer from the same limitations as the Boston one: regional
homogeneity.
153
Id. at 53.
154
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
155
FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 26.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 27. As one john explained this theory, “‘[i]f a person seeks sex
with a prostitute and doesn’t get it, he can go into the park and grab a girl and
rape . . .”; and another, “‘where there is lots of prostitution, no rapes.’” Id.
158
See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (“The distinction between people
selling sex who are versus are not compelled by a third party [e.g. a pimp or
trafficker] is usually invisible to buyers—particularly since most buyers are
motivated to believe that providers [prostituted women] are involved
voluntarily. Market incentives and fear of reprisals from pimps and traffickers
motivate providers of commercial sex who are trafficked to present themselves
as if they participate voluntarily, and most johns cannot (or choose not to) see
otherwise.”).
159
Researchers were unable to discern the real age of the prostituted people
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[them]” and that such women wished to exit the commercial sex
industry.160
Beyond an absence of enthusiasm, johns saw that the
prostituted people from whom they bought sex exhibited glaring
signs of harm: that they were children, that they were distressed,
that they had been coerced, and that their work subjected them to
violence.161 While it is impossible to tell the age of most of the
prostituted people about whom the johns posted, there are posts
indicating johns believe that some prostituted people are
underage.162 Oftentimes, researchers found that johns used
diminutive euphemisms like “petite,” “innocent,” “tiny,” or “little”
to describe the individuals from whom they had purchased sex.163
Other posts exhibited johns’ awareness of the coercive and
violent relationships between prostituted people and pimps. Many
johns noted that they believed pimps were dangerous.164 When
johns did express their belief that a certain pimp was dangerous,
they were mostly concerned for their own welfare.165 Johns
managed to gloss over evidence of abuse by pimps in order to
maintain the illusion that prostituted women and children enjoy sex
with them. One john on the USA Sex Guide spoke of a girl with
“scars” and a “bandaid,” but reassured his fellow johns that he
managed to get past these initial “turn-offs,” and, as the researchers
noted, “in the end he couldn’t resist . . . her ‘little body.’”166
Another john from the Boston study spoke somewhat regretfully
about a person from whom he bought sex when she had to give the
entire fee over to a man waiting for her.167 “I would have cancelled
that johns posted about. See JANSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 52
(“[C]omments on the Illinois Sex Guide about harm to women and girls relate
more to these johns’ general perceptions [about age] than to tangible
statistics[/characteristics].”).
160
Id.
161
See id. at 52–57.
162
See id. at 52–54.
163
See id.
164
See id. at 56 (“[M]en occasionally post about pimps . . . viewing them as
a potential danger.”).
165
See id. at 57.
166
Id. at 53.
167
See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 23.
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it,” the same john noted—because he knew she had been and
would be physically abused—“but for my urges . . . .” 168 Both the
online comments of johns and personal interviews with them
confirm that they are aware of—if not actively seeking—sex from
abused adults and from children.
The Boston study concluded that the johns had “extensive
knowledge about trafficking for prostitution.”169 Yet this
knowledge failed to deter johns from buying sex, or even from
buying sex from the specific person whom they suspected was
trafficked or abused.170 The Boston study attributed johns’
continued prostitution purchases to a few factors: johns not
considering the consequences of their actions; the significant ease
of buying sex; and the lack of law enforcement penalties that limit
their access to women in the industry.171 Both johns’ failure to
consider their actions and law enforcement’s failure to penalize
them are the exact failures in the law that this Note proposes to
remedy by accurately implementing statutory rape laws against
johns who buy sex from trafficked children.
C. Statutory Rape Charges against Johns are Consistent with
Other Prostitution Reform Efforts
Charging johns with statutory rape for buying sex from a
trafficked child would be applicable notwithstanding the larger
advances in prostitution reform. As discussed above, the
commercial sex industry in America is rife with violence, coercion,
and maltreatment of those who sell sex. The largest point of
contention among advocates wishing to correct these injustices is
how to go about doing so.172 The solution offered in this Note is
168

Id. Yet another john in the Boston study spoke of one prostituted
woman whom he knew was raped repeatedly by her pimp, but the rapes, he
commented, were only “[e]very once and a while, not every week . . . .” Id. at
24.
169
Id. at 24.
170
See id.
171
See id.
172
See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Should Buying Sex Be Illegal?, THE
NATION (July 30, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/180835/shouldbuying-sex-be-illegal?page=0,0 (describing the successes and failures of
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meant to correct the debase injustices leveled against children
trafficked into sex. There are, of course, larger issues in the sex
industry, such as how prostituted adults are treated, whether sex
work can be just that—work, and what reforms might produce the
best outcomes for both prostituted persons themselves and society
as a whole.173 An adult’s act of preying on a child for sex would
constitute statutory rape regardless of money changing hands. The
proposal in this Note would still remedy this injustice regardless of
whether the prostitution industry were legalized or further
criminalized.
In order to understand proposed reforms to prostitution, it is
important to examine the theoretical landscape of the United
States’ prostitution policies. Today, all jurisdictions in the United
States except Nevada criminalize prostitution.174 Sociologists
Barbara G. Brents and Kathryn Hausbeck, who study the
regulation of sex in America, contend that most United States
jurisdictions have prostitution policies that focus on abolitionism
(punishing “third-party ‘exploiters,’ not the ‘innocent’
prostitute”175) and criminalization (punishing the prostituted person
and anyone else promoting or engaging in prostitution).176
Criminalization policies are most common where law enforcement
criminalizes all three parties in the commercial sex industry: the
supply side (the prostituted adults), the distribution side (the
“pimps”), and the demand side (the johns).177
Those wishing to reform prostitution policies generally fall into
two camps: abolition and legalization. On one side of the feminist
legalization and abolition efforts worldwide regarding prostitution).
173
See id. (describing the debates between sex-work-as-work reformists,
and reformists who believe prostitution can never be a choice).
174
Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 132, at 308. See also NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.354(1) (West 2012). (“It is unlawful for any person to engage in
prostitution or solicitation therefor, except in a licensed house of prostitution.”).
175
Boston, Massachusetts, however has just instituted a prostitution policy
resembling abolitionism. Zachary T. Sampson, Program in Boston Targets Men
Who Buy Sex, BOS. GLOBE (June 4, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe
.com/metro/2014/06/03/city-aims-reduce-prostitution-targeting-those-who-payfor-sex/3RR2RtPPkF4Y2P7Ain0APO/story.html.
176
See Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 132, at 308–09.
177
See id. at 309.
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debate, abolitionists agree that the law should continue to punish
prostitution, but the law should re-frame prostitution as a crime
against prostituted people; a crime that serves to “mainly benefit
men.”178 Abolitionists are often concerned both with the treatment
of women and with the commodification of sex in prostitution.179
The commodification of sex, like paying for adoption, raises
concerns about commodification of the human body, a practice too
close to slavery for comfort.180
On the other side of this feminist debate,181 reformers support
the legalization of prostitution based on emerging notions of sex
work as an occupation and women’s voluntary participation
therein.182 Legalization advocates note, for example, that the
criminalization of voluntary sex work has led to grave human
rights abuses where sex workers are denied wages, health benefits,
and equal treatment under the law because of their label as
“prostitutes.”183 Legalization advocates argue that the overcriminalization of sex work has marginalized—and will further
marginalize—sex workers, and that the most practical approach to
eradicating violence and coercion in the industry is to implement
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See id.
See id.
180
See E DWARD W. N ELSON ET AL ., E THICS C OMM . OF O RGAN
P ROCUREMENT & T RANSPLANTATION N ETWORK , F INANCIAL I NCENTIVES
FOR O RGAN D ONATION : W HITE P APERS (June 30, 1993), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4 (stating that
“purely economic approaches to organ donation may start the ultimate slide
down the slippery slope–i.e. the human body literally becoming a commodity to
be bought, sold, and bartered . . . .” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); see
also M ICHAEL J. S ANDEL , W HAT M ONEY C AN ’ T B UY 9 (Farrar, Strauss and
Giroux eds., 1st ed. 2012). Michael Sandel summarizes, “[s]lavery was
appalling because it treated human beings as commodities, to be bought and sold
at auction.” Id.
181
See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and
Inequality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (2011).
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See Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 132, at 309.
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See, e.g., Sienna Baskin & Crystal DeBoise, Sex Workers Project,
Expert Letter to the U.N. Universal Periodic Review Concerning Sex Workers’
Rights (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/
2011/20110223-upr-expert-letter.pdf.
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regulations and government oversight.184
Under an abolitionist model, reformers would agree that using
statutory rape laws to pursue the dismantling of demand for
trafficked children would effectively punish the perpetrators who
create a market for underage people in sex work in the first
place.185 Yet, even under the legalization model, using statutory
rape laws to curb buying sex from children would be effective, as
traditional consent and rape laws would still be in place.
Furthermore, even if legalization had the effect of improving
working conditions for sex workers, failing to punish johns who
buy sex from a child would perpetuate the stereotype that children
in the sex industry do not deserve the same protections from
predatory adults as children outside of the sex industry.
Abolitionists believe that the sex industry must be criminalized
because it is impossible to disaggregate the sale of sex from the
objectification of women and its attendant violence.186 However,
both abolitionists and proponents of legalization agree that
prostitution should be free from coercion, be it physical, economic,
or that which is inherent when children are involved.187 Using
existing statutory rape laws to punish johns who buy sex from the
most marginalized and vulnerable segments of the sex industry—
children—is also a politically feasible solution before the
radicalization of any prostitution laws in the United States.
D. The Current Enforcement and Effects of the Criminalization
of Prostitution
Despite the codification of state laws against the suppliers,
distributors, and demand, the way such laws are enforced in the
United States today is, at best, uneven. Prostituted adults are much
more likely to be arrested for solicitation than johns are for
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See END DEMAND NYC: A CAMPAIGN TO END SEX TRAFFICKING,
http://www.enddemandnyc.org/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
186
See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 181, at 272–74.
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patronizing a prostitute.188 The frequent arrests of prostituted
people instead of johns are often a matter of police department
policy or practice.189 The “standard procedure” for police
enforcement of prostitution laws is “for undercover officers to pose
as customers, obtain a solicitation, and arrest the prostitute.”190
This process fails to account for the involvement of the
pimp/trafficker or john, and yet is “repeated . . . often to
incarcerate as many women as possible.”191 The lack of
enforcement against johns is not only a product of policies that
almost exclusively target prostituted women, but also one of
practicality. Police departments often do not have enough female
officers to pose as prostitutes in order to “conduct effective
solicitation enforcement campaigns” against the johns.192 A
Department of Justice report on effective enforcement of street
prostitution determined that “decoy arrests of clients [johns] are
open to legal entrapment defenses193 if officers are not careful.”194
188

See SCOTT, supra note 99, at 16 (“Historically, the police have arrested
far more prostitutes than clients.”).
189
See Steve Marcin, Prostitution and Human Trafficking: A Paradigm
Shift, FBI.GOV (March 2013), www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/lawenforcement-bulletin/2013/March/prostitution-and-human-trafficking. The
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS) study found that
enforcement was consistent with this police method, where enforcement
“usually requires undercover police officers to pose as clients to gather the
necessary evidence.” SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17.
190
Marcin, supra note 189. This bulletin highlights one jurisdiction’s (the
Anaheim Police Department’s) new tactic to police prostitution: help to remove
prostituted women, and focus on enforcing laws against pimps and traffickers.
Id. Anaheim’s findings after implementing the shift are encouraging for helping
survivors rebuild their lives, and prosecuting perpetrators of severe trafficking.
Id. However, the bulletin makes no mention of either criminalizing johns, or
whether the shift has successfully reduced sex trafficking in the area (or
surrounding areas).
191
Id.
192
SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17.
193
An entrapment defense is applicable “when a government agent induces
the defendant to commit the offense.” PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 209
(2014). The possibility of an entrapment defense may be especially odious to
police officers contemplating arresting johns because many interpret the
entrapment defense as a method “to deter police misconduct.” Id.
194
SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17.
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The entrapment defense appears to be unavailable to or widely
under-used by prostituted people, likely because when a police
officer acts as a decoy-john he waits for the prostituted person to
initiate an offer for sexual services.195
Criminalizing prostitution solely by fixating on the prostituted
people not only re-victimizes people forced into the commercial
sex industry,196 but also fails to reduce prostitution. The
Department of Justice report notes that arrests of prostituted people
“[b]y themselves . . . are ineffective at either controlling street
prostitution or protecting prostitutes from harm.”197 Consistently,
studies have found that targeting prostituted people merely
relocates the criminal activity to another area, and only
temporarily.198
Efforts to police pimps and traffickers, the distribution side of
the market, suffer from similar inadequacies.199 One nationwide
study highlights that distributors are “difficult to contain,” despite
heavy criminal penalties for both pimping and trafficking.200 With
“markets [that] are highly profitable, arrested traffickers and pimps
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It is unclear why undercover arrests would lead to more entrapment
defenses for johns than for prostitutes. This may be because johns have better
attorneys than prostitutes. This conclusion would not be difficult to surmise
given that the economic means of johns are much more lucrative (or at least
varied) than those of prostitutes. Indeed, a quick Google search with the terms,
“criminal defense for a prostitute” yields a first page of law firms and other
criminal defense websites, primarily representing johns. G OOGLE ,
https://www.google.com/ (search “criminal defense for a prostitute” in the
search bar) (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
196
MARCIN, supra note 189 (“The majority of prostitutes interviewed…
believed that selling themselves was their only alternative for survival…
[Further, pimps] use manipulation, threats, and violence to keep these women
from leaving.”).
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SCOTT, supra note 99, at 16.
198
See MARCIN, supra note 189; see also SCOTT, supra note 99, at 16
(“Increased police enforcement temporarily reduces the number of prostitutes on
the street, but they usually reappear in new areas.”); SHIVELY ET AL., supra note
8, at iv (“Efforts to reduce prostitution and sex trafficking by constraining
supply have not usually been successful, aside from temporary effects, or
displacing markets to other areas.”).
199
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at iv.
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are soon replaced.”201 The replacement process occurs quickly too
because “[d]istribution requires relatively little skill, and supply
[prostituted people] is plentiful and easily acquired, presenting few
barriers to entry or startup costs . . . .”202 In other words, efforts
aimed at addressing the supply side and the distribution side of the
commercial sex industry have failed to reduce the crime. Directly
targeting the johns would reduce demand and more effectively
reduce CSEC.
The commercial sex industry today is inextricably linked to the
exploitation of women and children. Past efforts at criminalization
of prostituted people and pimps have failed to contain such
exploitation. Stronger penalties for johns, who constitute the
demand for the commercial sex industry, would begin to cripple
the easy profits in such a market. Charging johns with statutory
rape, a felony offense, would also remove more johns from the
streets, deter the johns themselves from buying sex from children,
and deter the larger population of johns from seeking sex with
children in general.
KEEPING UP WITH THE JOHNS

IV.

A. Why Charge Johns with Statutory Rape?
Although prosecutors frequently use statutory rape laws as a
tool to prevent teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted
infections,203 to regulate teenage sexuality,204 and to more easily
201

Id.
Id.
203
See S HARON G. E LSTEIN & B ARBARA E. S MITH , A.B.A. C TR . ON
C HILDREN AND THE L AW , U.S. D EP’ T OF J USTICE, V ICTIM -O RIENTED
M ULTIDISCIPLINARY R ESPONSES TO S TATUTORY R APE : T RAINING G UIDE 3
(2000), available at http://www.ovc.gov/publications/infores/statutoryrape/
trainguide/victimoriented.pdf
(listing the “devastating consequences” of
statutory rape on teenagers as “pregnancy and parenthood, as well as sexually
transmitted diseases”); see also Oberman, supra note 15, at 705–06. Oberman
discusses how interest in statutory rape was “rekindled” when studies revealed
that many teenage pregnancies were the result of sexual intercourse with adult
men, and the costs of teenage pregnancy, such as increased use of public
assistance, were realized. Id. at 706.
204
See generally Oberman, supra note 15, at 706 (describing statutory
202
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try “acquaintance rape” cases,205 statutory rape charges are more
appropriate for the prosecution of people who buy sex from
children in the commercial sex industry. Such an application is
more akin to the purposes derived from English common law:206
prosecuting instances of rape where there is a gross difference in
age between the victim and the perpetrator, or where aspects of
coercion are present. Legislatures began creating statutory rape
laws in recognition of the special care due to minors, who are
sexually immature.207 Statutory rape is a crime of strict
liability208—the defendant may not assert the other party’s consent
as a defense,209 because a minor is not capable of giving legal
consent. Unlike forcible rape, statutory rape does not require force,
or threats of force, express or implied, in order for a perpetrator to
be found guilty.210
rape’s difficulty in “distinguishing between problematic adolescent sexual
behavior and normal adolescent sexual exploration”).
205
Id. at 748–49 (noting that “acquaintance rape” cases pose difficulties in
that defendants are more likely to raise a consent defense, and juries are more
likely to believe them; whereas statutory rape prohibits a consent defense).
206
The actual purposes at English common law were fairly degrading to
girls: “an effort to protect a father’s interest in his daughter’s chastity” so that
she might still earn a respectable dowry upon marriage. Id. at 754–55. This
purpose would also, unlike common law, be gender-neutral.
207
See TORCIA, supra note 4, § 285 (“[I]f any person shall unlawfully and
carnally know and abuse any woman-child under the age of ten years, it shall be
a felony without clergy.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
208
See id. § 285 n.23 (“It is no defense that the defendant did not know the
female’s age or reasonably believed her to be of the age of consent. . . . [And]
force is not an element of statutory rape.” (citations omitted)).
209
See id. at n.25 (“Since the lack of consent is not an element of statutory
rape, it is neither necessary nor relevant to show that the female did not
consent.”).
210
In Alaska, for example, sexual assault in the first degree is sexual
penetration “without consent,” which means “that a person . . . with or without
resisting, is coerced by the use of force against a person or property, or by the
express or implied threat of death, imminent physical injury, or kidnapping . . .
.” ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(1), 11.41.470(8)(A) (2013). Similarly, in
Montana, sexual assault is any sexual contact “without consent,” which means
compulsion by force, or “the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened
infliction of bodily injury . . . .” MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501(1)(a)(i),
501(2)(a), 502(1) (2013).
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Using statutory rape law for the purpose of criminalizing sex
where the perpetrator is vastly older than the victim, and where the
child is coerced, appropriately uses the strict liability standard to
protect a vulnerable population. By virtue of emotional and
physical immaturity—and especially by virtue of trafficked
children’s history of trauma—children merit special attention both
from the law and from adults with whom they come into contact.
Strict liability places the burden on adults to ensure that their
sexual encounters are not with children and are consensual.211
Professor Michelle Oberman, a legal scholar on ethical issues
and adolescence, agrees with this enforcement of statutory rape
laws and identifies these cases “between young people and
significantly older” perpetrators as “obviously exploitative.”212
Oberman asserts that these cases “seem relatively impervious to
claims that the relationship was consensual or loving.”213 A better
use of statutory rape laws—that is, to criminalize cases with abject
coercion where an older adult preys on a child or teenager—would
also more appropriately use the strict liability standard against
predators, rather than consensual teenagers.214
Charging johns with statutory rape would not only be just, it
would also be an effective means of reducing demand for the
commercial sex market of children. Numerous social science
studies and policy papers have found that tactics solely penalizing
the supply—prostituted people—and the distribution—the “pimps”
and traffickers—have failed to hamper the commercial sex market,
and thus the market for the sexual exploitation of children.215 One
211

See Oberman, supra note 15, at 765 (“To the extent that the age of
consent is determined by reference to maturation and adolescents’ general
[in]capacity to resist coercion, the absence of a mistake [of age] defense should
not be controversial.”).
212
Id. at 744.
213
Id.
214
See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 483 (“[B]roader contemporary
applications of statutory rape law [have led to] decades of absurd results and
disproportionately harsh penalties against teens.”).
215
See, e.g., SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 8 (“Many people who have
studied the problems of sex trafficking and prostitution . . . have independently
concluded that mitigating or eliminating sexual exploitation requires attacking it
at its source: consumer-level demand.”).
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Department of Justice study put this aptly:
Without the demand for commercial sex, there
would be no market forces producing and sustaining
the roles of pimps and traffickers as “distributors,”
nor would there be a force driving the production of
a “supply” of people to be sexually exploited.
Supply and distribution are symptoms; demand is
the cause.216
The Department of Justice study also highlights that demandreduction is “primary prevention” in that it “stop[s] events before
they occur.”217
For criminal charges to effectively deter johns, police would
need to enforce these charges, and prosecutors would need to
employ a charge with penalties greater than those currently
imposed. A new law in Sweden shows the power that enforcement
efforts can have on the commercial sex market. In 1999, Sweden
banned the purchase of sex.218 Since then, prostitution has dropped
by 70%.219 Under Sweden’s new system, prostituted people are
decriminalized; police may offer them help from social services
and if they decline, they are free to go as they please.220 Johns
discovered buying sex must immediately pay a fine determined by
their income or go to court and risk public scrutiny.221 By
monitoring common trafficking networks like online forums, the
Swedish police noticed that traffickers explicitly decide to leave or
refrain from entering Sweden because there is no profit to be
made.222 The law’s opponents, who believed that prostitution
216
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Id. at 78.
218
6 ch. 11 § (Svensk författningssamling [Swedish Code of Statutes]
[SFS] 2014:615) (Swed.), translated in Department of Justice, Chapter 6 of the
Swedish Penal Code 1962:700,
GOVERNMENT.SE (04 April 2005),
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Joan Smith, Why the Game’s up for Sweden’s Sex Trade, THE INDEPENDENT
(Mar.
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would become an even more dangerous industry for women, were
mistaken. Prostituted women from countries where prostitution is
legal stated that they were subjected to much less violence in
Sweden.223 Sweden’s outcomes indicate that real changes in the
commercial sex industry require more than a legislative
commitment to criminalizing johns. Rather, Sweden’s police
forces consistently enforced those laws against johns, resulting in a
smaller market for prostitution and thus a smaller market for the
trafficking of children.
Studies of johns in America, too, suggest that imposing greater
penalties on their criminal conduct would effectively deter them
from buying sex. The Boston study explicitly asked johns what it
would take to stop them from buying sex again.224 Eighty-eight
percent of the johns agreed: the most effective way to prevent them
from buying sex would be adding them to a sex offender registry
and all of them agreed that facing a punishment of one month of
jail time would deter their behavior.225 While a typical prostitution
offense carries little to no jail time,226 statutory rape is a much
more serious offense—a felony, for which jail time is mandated.227
Some states, like New York, have offenses for patronizing a child
prostitute, and they often carry harsher penalties than the offenses
for patronizing an adult prostitute.228 However, the penalties for
patronizing minors are consistently less severe than those for
223

See id.
See FARLEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 36–37.
225
Id. at 37. Several other studies using in-depth interviews of johns like
Farley et al. found similar responses to the penalties that would deter johns. See
id.
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See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(e.1) (2013) (grading the offense of
“patronizing prostitutes” as a “misdemeanor of the third degree,” which, under §
106(b)(8), carries a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment).
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See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.40 (2013) (grading “predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child” a Class X felony, with at least six years’
imprisonment, where an adult offender has sex with a victim under 13 years of
age).
228
Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.04 (McKinney 2013) (criminalizing
patronizing a prostitute in the third degree as a class A misdemeanor), with N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 230.06 (McKinney 2013) (criminalizing patronizing a prostitute
in the first degree as a class D felony where the “person patronized is less than
eleven years of age”).
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statutory rape.229 This difference in gradation sends a message to
potential perpetrators: having sex with a minor who is prostituted
is not as bad as having sex with a minor who has not been
prostituted.
Lawmakers should send a message to johns that having sex
with a child, regardless of whether the sex was paid for, is statutory
rape. Since it is a strict liability crime, a charge of statutory rape
for johns who have bought sex from children would relieve the
prosecution of proving that the john knew or should have known
that the person from whom he bought sex was a child, a common
element in patronizing a minor prostitute offenses.230 Further,
many if not most of the sexual encounters between a john and a
CSEC victim are tantamount to forcible rape—where violence,
force, or other aspects of coercion beyond the coercion inherent in
CSEC itself are present. Men in Illinois on the USA Sex Guide
described setting “the terms of their paid sexual encounter . . . and
complain[ed] about [prostituted] women . . . who attempt[ed] to
resist their physical groping.”231 Johns withheld tips from
prostituted women and girls if they did not perform exactly as they
wanted them to.232 But withholding tips is not the worst of the
punishment. Many johns on the USA Sex Guide used aggressive
sex, where the prostituted woman or child asked the john to stop or
told him that she was in pain; or other forms of violence if the
prostituted person refused to perform sexual acts without a

229

Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(b) (West 2013)
(criminalizing second degree sexual assault as a class B felony where the victim
is below 16 years of age), with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83(c) (West 2013)
(criminalizing patronizing a minor prostitute as a class C felony where the
victim is below 18 years of age, and the offender reasonably should have known
so).
230
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3212(B)(1) (2013) (“A person
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engaging in prostitution with a minor who is under fifteen years of age.”
(emphasis added)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83(c) (West 2013)
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condom, for example.233 Despite the frightening aspects of force
and violence that johns use to control sex with prostituted adults
and children, they are difficult to prove at trial in cases of forcible
rape because issues of force and coercion are subtle, and juries
tend to believe that, where physical injury and threats are lacking,
the victim consented.234 Statutory rape, on the other hand, requires
neither proof of force, nor proof of knowledge that the victim was
a child. The strict liability standard in statutory rape would make it
easier to prosecute johns, and thus would serve as a real deterrent
for johns contemplating buying sex from a child.
Even in the most extreme scenario of an “innocent” john, a
charge of statutory rape is justified. Consider a scenario where two
young men have sex with two different individuals—one of whom
was eighteen years old and one of whom was fifteen years old.
Each man sought to buy sex. Both young men reasonably believed
that the individual from whom they bought sex was at least
eighteen years old. One john had sex with an adult for a fee. The
other john actually had sex with a fifteen year-old for a fee. Setting
aside the criminalization, if any, of the first john, criminalizing the
second john with statutory rape is merited because the attendant
harms and consequences of his conduct were much greater for the
fifteen year-old prostituted child, and for society. Placing the
burden on adults to ensure that their adult activities, and especially
their adult crimes, do not involve children ensures the protection of
an incredibly vulnerable population.
Recall that most johns seek prostituted persons who are as
young as possible; many johns are violent and forceful; and a
shocking number of johns are aware of children forced into
prostitution.235 Given these trends, it is especially important to
consider why the seemingly harsh standard of strict liability is
critical. If the standard of culpability for the rape of a CSEC victim
were modified even to negligence, the ramifications would be
devastating. A perpetrator could then claim that he thought the
victim was older.236 Thus, victims would be “subjected to the
233
234
235
236
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See Oberman, supra note 15, at 749.
See supra Section III.B.
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process of objectification inevitable in evaluating a claim that they
looked older than their years.”237 Removing strict liability in
statutory rape against johns would put an already-coerced victim
on trial once more, inevitably devolving into a scrutiny of her
appearance, her clothes, her attitude, her speech, and her behavior.
The two johns in this scenario had similar culpability, but their
conduct had drastically different results: because one raped a child,
more severe sanctions are appropriate.
This scenario came to life when professional football player
Lawrence Taylor had sex with a sixteen year-old victim of CSEC
in a New York hotel room.238 Taylor pleaded guilty to sexual
misconduct and patronizing a sixteen year-old prostitute.239
Despite his guilty plea, Taylor seemed to believe that he was
innocent, citing prostitution as “‘one of those crimes’ that you
never think about ‘because everybody does it.’”240 He further
maintained his innocence by essentially advocating a mistake-ofage defense, saying that he does not “card prostitutes or ask for
their birth certificates,”241 and contending that the victim said she
was nineteen years old.242
Taylor’s case might evoke sympathy, like the second john from
the scenario above, but the trafficked girl from whom he bought
sex told a story much different from Taylor’s. In a civil suit she
filed against Taylor for the rape, she first noted that Taylor should
have been able to tell that she was both underage and had been
beaten by a trafficker to coerce her exploitation.243 Second,
237
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Taylor’s victim testified to aspects of forcible rape, wherein the
“hulking Taylor failed to stop having sex with her even after she
told him it hurt and tried to push him away.”244 And yet, despite
evidence even of physical force, under the current law a civil jury
could not find Taylor liable for his victim’s rape because he was
allowed to present evidence that he “believed” her to be older than
she was.245 Furthermore, it seems that in order to make out civil
liability, Taylor’s victim would have had to produce direct
evidence that he was aware of both her youth and her coercion in
the sex trade246—a preposterous evidentiary standard when the
john who seeks out younger and younger women under control of
a pimp can simply claim ignorance. The justification for the strict
liability standard of statutory rape stands as a compelling
alternative to the negligence standard presented, for example, in a
civil suit for the rape of a trafficked child.
Bringing statutory rape charges against johns who buy sex
from children will deter johns from participating in the coerced sex
industry. A statutory rape charge also reaffirms that CSEC victims,
like Lawrence Taylor’s, are children worthy of society’s
protection. Some states allow a mistake of age defense for certain
statutory rape offenses, most commonly where the difference in
age between the adult and the child is small: “I’m not guilty
because I thought she was older.”247 But the failure to arrest,
charge, and prosecute johns with statutory rape for having sex with
CSEC victims shows an implicit acceptance of a mistake-ofprostitute defense: “I’m not guilty because she was a prostitute.”
The crime of statutory rape does not penalize discriminately based
on the prostituted status of child victims;248 if an adult has sex with
244

Id.
Id.
246
Cf. id. (describing how after an hour of deliberation the jury rejected the
victim’s testimony in favor of Taylor’s version of the account).
247
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.325 (West 2013) (“When
criminality depends on the child’s being under a specified age other than 16, it is
an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove that the defendant reasonably
believed the child to be above the specified age at the time of the alleged
offense.”).
248
This is different from the typical statutory criminalization of
patronizing, which—though proscribing the same conduct—is typically only a
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a child, that child is a victim, regardless of the circumstances
leading up to her rape.
However, charging johns with statutory rape without
considering their participation in furthering a market that sells
children would not fully capture the scope of their criminality.
Johns stimulate an industry that sells children’s bodies for adults’
sexual pleasure. Most johns are aware of their participation in such
an exploitative industry.249 The victim’s status as a child of CSEC
should not be ignored or downplayed. A victim’s status as a child
of CSEC should be treated as a type of “vulnerability,” meriting an
aggravating factor to be considered at sentencing.250 Trial courts
have the discretion to determine vulnerability; some have held that
age is a vulnerability indicator while others have not.251 But here, a
victim’s status as a forced instrument for paid sexual gratification
seems impervious to doubts about vulnerability.252 Applying
statutory rape charges to johns who buy sex from children would
reduce the demand for paid sex from coerced persons, protect
minor victims of trafficking, and restore humanity to the children
of CSEC who, for too long, have been treated as delinquents.
B. The Statutory Rape Solution: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Practical Application
Using statutory rape as a charge against johns who buy sex
from children is legally tenable, but in reality the efficacy of this
charge turns on its enforcement by prosecutors. As with the
charging decisions in Nina’s and Vivian’s situations described at
misdemeanor or a felony less severe than statutory rape. Compare CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(b) (West 2013) (criminalizing second degree sexual
assault as a class B felony where the victim is below 16 years of age), with
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-83(c) (West 2013) (criminalizing patronizing a
minor prostitute as a class C felony where the victim is below 18 years of age,
and the offender reasonably should have known so).
249
For vivid examples of johns who appear to have actual knowledge of the
violence in the system, see supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text.
250
See William D. Bremer, Vulnerability of Victim as Aggravating Factor
under State Sentencing Guidelines, 73 A.L.R. 5th 383, § 1[a] (1999).
251
See id. § 2[a].
252
In a number of cases, courts have held that certain relationships between
the victim and the perpetrator are factors to be considered at sentencing. See id.
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the beginning of this Note, prosecutors have wide latitude in
determining whom to charge, and with what offenses to charge
them.253 Despite this broad discretion,254 there have been virtually
no recorded instances of a john being charged with statutory rape
for having sex with a victim of CSEC.255 As outlined in this Note,
there are practical and prejudiced reasons for this failure. As a
practical matter, police forces lack adequate resources to, or have
actively refrained from, arresting johns,256 pursuing instead the
more visible prostituted people and traffickers in the commercial
sex industry. Maybe johns seem like less culpable offenders when
compared to the traffickers who manipulate, assault, and finally
enslave vulnerable children desperate to survive. Yet the sexual
exploitation of children would not survive were the johns not
paying for its existence. As a matter of prejudice, though, law
enforcement officials do not pursue johns because they perceive
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has studied the topic of CSEC extensively, too has not found a case of this type.
See Godsoe, supra note 16. They may exist, and their absence could be for
reasons other than prosecutorial or police neglect: usually only appellate
decisions are published on commercial databases, and these cases may not be
appealed; or johns may plead out when confronted with this charge. Missouri—
the one state that codifies the offense of patronizing a minor prostitute as a class
D felony—explicitly refers in that same statutory provision to the prosecution’s
right to charge violators with statutory rape. MO. REV. STAT. § 567.030(4)
(2014) (“Nothing in this section shall preclude the prosecution of an individual
for the offense of: (1) Statutory rape in the first degree . . . .”). Unfortunately, a
search under this provision did not produce any cases that took advantage of this
statutory encouragement by the Missouri legislature.
256
See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 79 (“Frequently, police will raid
brothels or conduct street operations and arrest persons engaged in selling sex,
and occasionally arrest a pimp, but simply let the ‘customers’ go without any
intervention, or after receiving less serious sanctions than the victims or
pimps.”); see also SCOTT, supra note 99, at 17 (noting that police departments
do not have enough female officers to catch johns).
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prostituted people as the wrongdoers,257 a perception so powerful
that it holds children forced into sexual slavery to be wrongdoers
in the same stratum as their adult parallels.
Practitioners and scholars have offered many exemplary
solutions to aid the problem of CSEC, such as improving state
CSEC laws by making it harder for children to be prosecuted for
prostitution, funding more victim services, and elevating judicial
discretion in CSEC cases.258 But getting changes through the
legislature can be frustrating, if not futile. Further, training judges
to respond to CSEC victims who are charged with a crime is a step
too late in the criminal process to prevent the manifestation of
further exploitation. To stymie CSEC, the law must grapple with
the force that creates it: the demand for underage commercial sex.
Prosecutors have the power to begin charging johns with a
crime that more justly fits their conduct: the rape of a child.
Moreover, prosecutors’ charging decisions guide enforcement by
police; prosecutors have almost unfettered discretion in such
decisions.259 With regard to policy, prosecutors have more control
than the police, who “tend to follow prosecutors in their
enforcement activities, since they don’t want to commit their time
to investigating cases that are not carried forward to prosecution,
or that result in minimal penalties.”260 Prosecutors’ commitment to
charging johns with a more serious offense will motivate police to
actively pursue johns through raids,261 reverse stings,262 and reports
257

See SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 80 (“[M]ost police and prosecutors
did not regard women working for pimps necessarily to be sex trafficking
victims.”).
258
See discussion, supra Part II.B.
259
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE AND
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993) (“The prosecutor is not obliged
to present all charges which the evidence might support . . . .”); id. § 3-3.4 (“The
decision to institute criminal proceedings should be initially and primarily the
responsibility of the prosecutor” and the prosecutor “should establish standards
and procedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal
proceedings should be instituted.”); id. § 3-2.7 (describing the prosecutor’s
relationship with the police as one that includes “provid[ing] legal advice to the
police concerning police functions and duties on criminal matters . . . .”).
260
SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 80.
261
A “raid” is an operation where many police officers descend on a
suspected area of prostitution activity, usually a brothel, gather evidence, and
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from CSEC victims of their rapists.
Although the enforcement of statutory rape charges in cases of
CSEC has been woefully deficient, there is evidence of cases
where the prosecution could have brought such a higher charge
against johns. One New York preliminary hearing, People v.
Jackson,263 is a glaring example of the overcriminalization of
prostituted people and the undercriminalization of johns. There, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence to proceed to trial
against two prostituted women for solicitation.264 A footnote to the
facts of the case indicates that the john who was to give testimony
against the two female defendants had been “separately charged
with patronizing a prostitute in violation of s. 230.05 of the Penal
Law” in the same case.265 That section of the Penal Law
criminalizes patronizing a prostitute who is less than fourteen years
old.266 However, the prosecution granted this john immunity in
order to secure his testimony against the two prostituted women.267
It is unclear from Jackson whether one or both of the female
defendants were under fourteen years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. What is clear, however, is that the
prosecutor would have had enough evidence to charge this john
with statutory rape, rather than patronizing a prostitute—given that
he had bought sex from at least one child who was no older than
thirteen years.268 The tragedy of Jackson is that the prosecutor
decided to pursue charges against two prostituted people at the
arrest offenders on-site. SHIVELY ET AL., supra note 8, at 45. Shively et al.
suggest using raids to arrest johns, and then further suggest infiltrating storefront
brothels, like a massage parlor, make appointments posing as prostitutes, and
continue to arrest johns who were not at the initial raid. Id.
262
A “reverse sting” is an operation where undercover police officers pose
as prostitutes in an effort to find and arrest johns; a “sting,” on the other hand, is
the more common undercover operation, where undercover police officers pose
as johns in order to arrest prostituted people. Id. at 37 (“The term ‘reverse sting’
is an artifact of the historic gender inequity in the enforcement of prostitution.”).
263
People v. Jackson, 33 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972).
264
Id. at 221.
265
Id. at 218 n.1.
266
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.05 (McKinney 2014).
267
See Jackson, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 218 n.1.
268
See id. What’s more disturbing is the opinion’s allusion to this john’s
frequent “visits” to buy sex, likely from children. Id. at 218.
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expense of prosecuting a john who had bought sex from a
child269—a john who actively participated in creating the sexual
market of children.
An Illinois case and a Missouri case provide further examples
of the need to begin prosecuting johns for attempted statutory rape
when they directly proposition children for sex in exchange for
payment.270 In Illinois, the prosecution charged the defendant in
People v. Jones with soliciting juvenile prostitution when he tried
to get a child under the age of sixteen to have sex with him for
money.271 Although the Jones defendant made out the elements for
attempted statutory rape, the prosecution gave no indication that
such a charging decision was on the horizon.272
In a Missouri case with facts similar to Jones, the prosecution
in State v. Warren made no distinction between a defendant’s two
counts of patronizing prostitution, even though one was for
propositioning an adult and the other for propositioning a fifteenyear-old boy.273 Although neither of the accosted individuals had
been involved in the commercial sex industry,274 the defendant
here could have been charged with attempted statutory rape.
Statutory rape is an especially effective charge for johns like the
defendants in Jones and Warren who lure vulnerable children into
the sex industry by directly propositioning them for paid sex.275
The outcome of Warren is especially dissatisfying given that
Missouri’s penal code expressly permits the prosecution to charge
a john with both statutory rape and attempted statutory rape.276
269

See id. at 218 n.1.
See People v. Jones, 615 N.E.2d 391, 392 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v.
Warren, 717 S.W.2d 231, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
271
Jones, 615 N.E.2d at 392.
272
Id. at 394. However, the court did conclude by stating that the alleged
acts might constitute “an inchoate attempt or solicitation offense of a different
statutory section,” despite their inapplicability to solicitation of a juvenile
prostitute; the court was likely referring to a patron crime. Id. at 395.
273
See Warren, 717 S.W.2d at 231.
274
See id.
275
See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 48–49.
276
See MO. REV. STAT. § 567.030(4) (2014). The john’s conduct in State v.
Warren constituted a class A misdemeanor under Missouri’s prostitution
statutes, but would have constituted a class D felony under attempted statutory
sodomy. See id. §§ 566.064, 567.030(3).
270
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Despite the absence of cases in which prosecutors charged
johns with statutory rape, some media accounts reflect situations
where johns were charged with statutory rape but pleaded out to
lesser charges. Marvell Scott, a former WABC sportscaster, was
initially charged with statutory rape and patronizing a prostitute
when he had sex with a fourteen year-old girl.277 He took her to his
apartment after a trafficker “offered” her to him in Times Square in
2008.278 Even though court papers depicted a typical CSEC
scenario, Scott accepted a deal in which he admitted to
endangering the welfare of a child.279 The fourteen-year-old girl
whom Scott raped had run away, and had run out of money, when
a trafficker took advantage of her desperation.280 Although
endangering the welfare of a child is a relatively minor charge for
Scott’s purported conduct, the fact that Scott hastened into a plea
deal may indicate that he genuinely feared the prosecution’s top
charge of statutory rape were he to proceed to trial.281
Prosecutors have long overlooked statutory rape as a charge
against johns who have bought sex from children, despite recent
opportunities in especially high-profile cases. If prosecutors used
the charge of statutory rape against johns, police conduct—but
277

Italiano, supra note 17.
Id.
279
See id.
280
See id.
281
However, an episode of Law and Order Special Victims Unit, took
Scott’s case more seriously and used it to craft an episode where dozens of johns
were charged with statutory rape for having sex with a victim of CSEC. See Law
& Order: Special Victims Unit: Spiraling Down (NBC television broadcast Dec.
7, 2011). Although Law & Order: Special Victims Unit claims that all of its
stories are fictional, many are “ripped from the headlines.” See, e.g., Abby
Rogers, 15 True Stories That Inspired Your Favorite ‘Law and Order’ Episodes,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Mar.
21,
2012,
5:05
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/real-crimes-that-inspired-law-and-orderepisodes-2012-3?op=1. Since this episode aired a few months after Scott pled
guilty, and the facts are extremely similar, it would be logical to conclude that
Scott’s story inspired this one. In the episode, the detectives who found the
runaway girl suggested that the Assistant District Attorney (ADA) prosecute the
johns for statutory rape. Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Spiraling Down
(NBC television broadcast Dec. 7, 2011). The Unit finally reached an
agreement: to conduct a sting for the named johns, and arrest them for statutory
rape. Id.
278
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more importantly, johns’ conduct—would dramatically change.
Police would be encouraged to make arrests of johns, rather than
pass out violations, or ignore the population of johns all together.
Further, johns who have already raped a CSEC victim would be
chilled from doing so again, and johns contemplating raping a
CSEC victim would have to consider both the risk of increased
enforcement by police officers against their conduct and the risk of
being charged with a felony offense of strict liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Charging johns with statutory rape would serve many purposes
for both victims and offenders. First, the charge would reinforce
the idea that these children are victims and are incapable of
consenting to the sale of sex. Second, a statutory rape charge
would provide consistency in the law for courts who have
struggled with the notion of punishing children like Vivian and
Shaneiqua for their own exploitation. Finally, a felony charge
against these perpetrators would decrease the demand for child
prostitution by deterring buyers with the threat of significant jail
time, a felony record, and being added to the sex offender registry.
The fastest way to dismantle a market is to dissolve demand. The
strict liability standard of statutory rape is an important tool for
pursuing the adults who create such demand. This charge would
not only include the johns who buy sex from children through
traffickers, but also the ones who engage in sexual acts with
children whom they have directly propositioned.282
Existing state law of statutory rape can address and reduce the
demand for trafficked children. While this is a viable and
necessary approach, it is not the only way to affect CSEC.
Expanding social education and eradicating poverty are two other
critical components in this battle. Any sustainable change must
work toward preventing johns from wanting to buy sex in the first
place. Our society might achieve such changes by increasing
education on trafficking, coercion, and respect for prostituted
people and sex workers in the commercial sex industry.
Policymakers should envision a culture where sex is not a
282

CURTIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 48.
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commodity and women and children are not objects. Additionally,
the initial circumstances that put children at risk for trafficking—
such as child abuse, sexual abuse, poverty, and family
dysfunction—will not disappear by charging johns with statutory
rape. We must press on in efforts to support low-income families,
treat children who have been abused, and infuse more services into
disenfranchised communities. Low-income communities are
targets for trafficking largely because of law enforcement’s general
neglect of and indifference to their needs. However, creating the
conditions that foster education and services begins with the law,
and with the just enforcement of it. For children who have been
exploited, the law has the power to remedy attitudes about who is
truly culpable, and who is truly innocent.

